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I.  Introduction 
 
 
This report is a review of literature on freedom of association with regard to civil society and 
political parties in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf. Attention is also paid to 
Islamic movements and groups, and youth and gender. This introduction outlines the format 
of the review, and clarifies the scope and framework. Section II defines freedom of 
association and highlights regional trends and debates in the literature with regard to the role 
of civil society, political institutions, Islamic NGOs and movements and, nominally (as very 
littler literature was found on it), the role of youth in democratic development in the Arab 
world.  
 
In Section III I recommend ways in which gaps in research can be addressed. Appendix A 
lists regional and international organizations working on the issue of freedom of association 
(with regard to civil society and political parties). Where available descriptions of projects are 
provided. The list is restricted to those organizations and projects mentioned in the literature 
reviewed and is not, thus, exhaustive. Appendix B provides a summary of selected countries’ 
political and governmental mechanisms that foster or constrain freedom of association. 
Appendix C provides selected country profiles of the state of freedom of association. At the 
end of the report is a list of references, as well as a further list of relevant works for further 
study.  
 
The review examines the literature in terms of the efficacy of civil societies and political 
parties in democratization and liberalization processes in the Arab world, Iran and Turkey. 
The review reflects assumptions in the literature that both state and social structures are 
important determinants of social and political change processes (see Moghadam 2004). I 
confer, also, with analyses that underline the importance of examining civil society in relation 
to more overtly political processes and contexts.  
 
Searches of journal articles and books were conducted through IDRC library databases. 
Internet searches were also conducted. The following questions guided the selection of 
literature reviewed and the information sought: What is the state of civil society and political 
parties in the region, and what is their relationship to processes of democratization and 
liberalization? Is a vibrant civil society necessary but not sufficient for attaining political 
democratization? Is the existence of political parties an essential feature and valid indicator 
of democratic government? What happens to the effectiveness and autonomy of political 
parties when they join governments in the region? How broadly or specifically does freedom 
of association need to be defined, implemented, and monitored to ensure vibrant civil 
societies and political parties? What is the role of Islamist movements and Islamic NGOs in 
society-state relations? Are Islamist movements a ‘threat’ to democratic development? If not, 
what role can they play in pro-democracy processes? What role do youth play in pro-
democracy movements and institutions, and are they incorporated into pro-democracy 












The autonomy and effectiveness of civil societies and political parties are key indicators of 
state-society relations and, hence, of processes of democratization. There is much debate 
surrounding the question of what characteristics in particular render civil societies and 
political parties agents of change and democratization.1 Michael Hudson notes that 
democratization, in part, involves a decrease in the state’s power to be arbitrary and exclusive 
(Hudson 1988:157).  
 
The democratic ideal is certainly relevant to the region, and its adherents can be found at all 
levels of society and government. For example, Qatar’s foreign minister, Hamad bin Jasim 
Al Thani, explained his support for Al-Jazeera satellite television channel on CBS’s 60 
Minutes, thus: 
I think [Arab] people are not used… to hearing things which they don’t like, 
especially the top people, including me. However, democracy has started. Either the 
leaders like it, or they don’t like it. Either you open the door, or they break the door. 
It’s a matter of time, in my opinion (Kéchichian 2004:44). 
A handful of regimes in the Middle East have had a peaceful change of regime through free 
elections, which is considered the ‘acid test’ of democracy (Tachau 1994:xvi). But there is a 
general absence of free elections in the Arab world, and the problem of democracy in the 
region goes beyond peaceful regime change and electoral politics (see Ghalioun 2004).  
 
Despite the frankness of Al Thani’s words above, mechanisms and institutions of 
democratization and liberalization are, by and large, adopted by Arab governments as means 
of securing their authoritarian rule. Hudson’s definition does not apply to most Arab 
countries. As Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger conclude in their study on regime 
change, “there is no such thing as democracy or democratization in the Arab world today” 
(Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:372). In practice, this means that the state “remains strong 
enough to revert to more authoritarian measures if required” and is reluctant to allow civil 
society too much autonomy (see Brynen, Korany and Noble 1995b:336).  
 
In much of the literature, modernization, ‘individualism’ and the emergence of democratic 
institutions are often taken for granted as necessary conditions for civil society (Kamali 
2001:457; see also Alexander 1998, and Gellner 1994). Authors such as Masoud Kamali 
point out, though, that the modernization programs in the region have been selective and, 
except sporadically, incompatible with democratization. The result has been isolated states, 
and the emergence of ‘modern’ civil societies that remain marginalized, in opposition to the 
state, and ineffective in terms of “engaging in real democratic games” (Kamali 2001:478-79).  
                                                 
1 Democratization is the transition of a nondemocratic political system to a democratic polity. Democracy is 
understood here as a political system in which all effective positions of government power are attained through 
competition at regular intervals, and where there is a high degree of political participation, and civil and political 
liberties (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:387, n.1). 
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Similarly, Burhan Ghalioun notes that modernization from above in the Arab world has 
increased both the authoritarian nature of states and the fragmentation of society. He states: 
Even as it reinforces centralized power by equipping it with new technical means of 
organization, management, and control, modernization undermines older sources of 
social solidarity and cohesion, leaving individuals helpless and adrift. Hence the state 
becomes stronger as it modernizes, while society grows more fragile (Ghalioun 
2004:128). 
 
Albrecht and Schlumberger argue that it is important to examine both factors of 
democratization as well as the factors that enable Arab regimes to persist in their 
authoritarianism (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004). Centralization of power has been the 
dominant feature of Arab states (apart from Lebanon). The regimes that have replaced the 
postindependence regimes do not have the trust and support of the populace. Rather, in 
Burhan Ghalioun’s words,  
These newer regimes enjoy no popular support. They serve only the interests of the 
clans who hold power, they communicate in no way whatsoever with their 
citizenries, and they depend for their survival solely upon coercion and multiple 
security services. These regimes go beyond dictatorship; they put the state in the 
service of elites corrupted against the nation (Ghalioun 2004:127) 
Ghalioun argues that the “stagnation of power,” meaning the absence of turnover or renewal 
of ruling elites, is the cause of the failure of these regimes (Ghalioun 2004:127).  
 
The Arab world is notable for the persistence of its authoritarian regimes, when other 
regions have experienced a decline of dictatorships (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:373). 
Also, unlike in other regions of the world, the revolt by civil society against authoritarianism 
has been delayed in the Arab world (Ghalioun 2004:128). One reason for this delay has been 
the influence of Western strategic interests in the region. Ghalioun argues that the bolstering 
of repressive regimes by the West in order to secure its interests, along with oil and mineral 
rents and remittances from nationals working abroad, has enabled Arab regimes to ignore 
public opinion and avoid improving their governance or seeking popular support (Ghalioun 
2004:129). As a result, regimes became autonomous from their populations and “decades of 
tyranny and exclusion have left Arab civil societies highly disorganized” (Ghalioun 
2004:129). The disarray of civil societies, then, is seen as linked to the unconditional Western 
support for existing regimes. And this link, Ghalioun contends, explains the difficulty in 
transitioning to democratic states and societies in the Middle East (Ghalioun 2004:129).  
 
Civil societies and political parties nonetheless function in contexts of authoritarian states 
and often take forms that are shaped by their environments (Tachau 1994:xvi). Demands for 
greater and effective political participation are evident in the region (Tachau 1994:xv). In the 
1980s and early 1990s, there were indications of growing pluralism in Jordan, Egypt, Algeria, 
and Yemen. Hudson notes that these signs were ignored or overlooked by Western 
academics and journalists (Hudson 1991:407-22; referenced in Tachau 1994:xv). 
Experiments with political liberalization by Arab regimes, and a “renewed drive” to ward 
liberalization in the late 1980s to the mid-1990s have been a major focus of scholarly 
literature since the early 1990s (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:373). Multiparty elections, a 
lessening of restrictions on the media, increased levels of individual freedoms, and the 
proliferation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) became the focus of studies.  
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The literature evolved from ad hoc studies to attempts to systematically compare factors of 
liberalization and democratization of political systems across the region. The latter is 
reflected in two volumes edited by Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen and Paul Noble (see Korany, 
Brynen and Nobel 1998, and Brynen, Korany and Noble 1995a). Contributors to the 
volumes examine the interrelationship between culture and politics, civil society, the political 
economy of Arab authoritarianism and reform, and regional and international forces. 
Patterns identified include initial political openings of regimes followed by their resistance to 
any ‘deepening’ or democratization of the reform process (for example, in Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco, Kuwait, and the transition to Palestinian self-government) (Brynen, Korany and 
Noble 1995b:336). This resistance to democratization, note Brynen, Korany, and Noble: 
is further reinforced in many cases by the fear that the existing regime ultimately 
stands as the only guarantor of political stability. Secularists fear the rise of Islamist 
influence; Islamists fear an Algerian-style clampdown; communal minorities fear 
majoritarianism (Brynen, Korany and Noble 1995b:336). 
 
These constraints are particularly strong in monarchies, and in societies divided by deep 
social cleavages and where no consensus exists over possible alternatives to the presiding 
political order (Brynen, Korany and Noble 1995b:336). One of the key factors in stalling 
political liberalization is identified by Amy Hawthorne as the alliances that are forged 
between pro-democracy groups and repressive regimes (most notably but not exclusively in 
Algeria and Tunisia) in order to stave off demands of Islamist groups (Hawthorne 2004:13; 
see also Garon 2003).2  
 
These and other constraints to democratization have a direct bearing on the efficacy of civil 
societies. The question of how to create or foster a confluence of forces to support 
democratization is at the basis of much of the literature on civil societies. Current attempts 
to establish a democratic government in Iraq have served to highlight questions of 
democratization, and the form and roles therein of civil societies, elections, political parties, 
Islamist movements, constitutions and other political entities. The following section defines 




Definition and legal framework of the right to freedom of association: 
 
The European Commission has defined freedom of association as "a general capacity for the 
citizens to join, without interference by the State, in associations in order to attain various 
ends" (Human Rights First 1997). While all the major international and regional treaties on 
                                                 
2 Islamist groups hope to seize political power and recognize state power as a necessary step in realizing their 
goal of establishing Muslim society and polity. Notably, the spectrum of political Islam is broad, with only a 
few Islamic groups being fundamentalist. The term fundamentalist, coined in the early twentieth century to 
describe a strand of Protestant Christians in the United States, implies passive observance of a literal reading of 
sacred scripture. On the other hand, the term Islamist refers to groups that are trying to adapt tenets of Islam 
to changing times and circumstances. The term Islamist is favoured in the literature as it is seen to better reflect 
the forward-looking positions of these groups in their attempts to bring about reconstruction of the social 
order (Wright 1996:n.p.).  
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human rights underline the right to freedom of association, it remains unclear what precise 
rights are required in order to guarantee the free association of individuals to join and run 
organizations. A Human Rights First study indicates that if freedom of association stops at 
the right to form and join an association, “governments could restrict the ability of groups to 
operate freely. They might interfere with the internal decisions and organization of the 
association, with devastating consequences” (Human Rights First 1997). Indeed, the right to 
associate with others and form or join associations is linked to freedom of expression and 
opinion, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of movement, and also freedom from 
human rights violations. 
 
Freedom of association involves the right to join, form, and withdraw membership from 
groups, associations and partnerships of different kinds. It can also involve the right of 
associations to maintain control over their membership (to avoid government control). It 
requires, then,  
the non-interference of the state in the formation and in the affairs of associations 
that function within the scope of law. It also requires the assistance of the state in 
creating and maintaining an environment that is conducive to the exercise of the 
right to free association (Bello 2003:1).  
 
The legislative protection of freedom of association can be meaningless if there is no 
practical protection of other rights and of fundamental human rights. A recurring theme in 
the literature is that freedom of association needs to be accompanied by accountable 
government institutions and coordinated efforts to secure various other freedoms.  
 
In terms of its legal specificities, extensive discussion of the critical elements of the right to 
freedom of association has occurred in the context of International Labour Organization 
(ILO) conventions and interpretations. For example, the right to affiliate with other national 
and international organizations is specifically guaranteed to trade unions in ILO Convention 
87 (Article 5) (Human Rights First 1997). A Human Rights First study asserts that the 
particular provisions in ILO conventions and interpretations need to be extended to the 
right of freedom of association found in “traditional” human rights law (Human Rights First 
1997). The discussion put forth in their report provides a potentially useful guiding 
framework for international donor promotion of freedom of association (and informs some 
of the recommendations included in this review). For example, it notes that: 
Registration is frequently, although not universally, required in order for an NGO to 
attain legal personality. It is therefore critical for NGOs that the registration process 
is not so burdensome that it, in effect, denies the right to association at all. Instead it 
should be quick, straightforward, cheap and subject to independent judicial review 
(Human Rights First 1997). 
 
The guarantee of straightforward registration is the first of three types of legal provisions 
recommended by Leon Iris and Karla Simon in their study of enabling environments needed 
to protect nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The other two are: 
- Laws that prevent undue interference by the state; and 
- Laws that allow access to funds from private sources, the state, or economic 
activities (Irish and Simon 1999:2). 
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The authors emphasize the need for such legal safeguards to abide by international standards 
for transparency and self-governance, and human rights norms. It is these wider standards 
and norms that are seen to potentially guard against increasingly sophisticated attempts by 
governments to restrict the operations of organizations, particularly human rights NGOs, 
through legal and quasi-legal controls.  
 
The attempt on the part of governments to restrict or control the work of civil society 
organizations is exemplified in Tunisia’s amendment to its law on associations. The 
amendment provides for the right of any "individual to join an association provided that he 
or she subscribe to its principles." This seemingly benign change in the law has been 
condemned by the Tunisian League for Human Rights as it is seen to permit the ruling party 
to take control of the League.3 Such laws speak to the need for NGOs to retain legal control 
over the membership and management of the organizations (Human Rights First 1997).  
 
In sum, the right to freedom of association needs to be developed in terms of its legal 
specificities and provisions to provide better protection to nongovernmental organizations 
worldwide (Human Rights First 1997). But, as will be more clear below, the authoritarian 
political institutions of the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf can render these legal 
provisions meaningless. Some of the factors that constrain or protect the right to freedom of 
association are discussed below. 
 
 
What is the state of the right to freedom of association in the Arab world? 
 
The Arab Human Development Report 2003 tells us that: 
 
Regulations governing the freedom to form associations that were laid down in the 
colonial period endorsed the rule of free assembly, provided that the founding 
organizers informed the competent authorities of the association’s creation. The 
situation today is that, except for those older laws, all other amendments governing 
freedom of association made in the post independence and national liberation era are 
restriction-oriented (UNDP 2003:154).  
 
Restrictions on freedom of association in the Arab world include legal constraints on 
associations and publications (UNDP 2003:154). Common reasons given by states in their 
denial of registration of NGOs, are the apparent “political” nature of the organization, or 
the fact that its aims are too similar to those of other NGOs (Human Rights First 1997). In 
addition, legal guarantees in place to protect associational life, including constitutions, 
become invalidated during times of war and under emergency law (which has been in place 
continually in Egypt since 1981, and in Syria and Lebanon at different times) (AbuKhalil 
2002:843). A state of emergency releases the state from the need for constitutional or legal 
                                                 
3 International Constitutional Law (ICL) provides English translations of constitutional documents and cross-
references these and other materials for quick comparison of constitutional provisions. The link: 
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/index.html 
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accountability. The separation of authorities is undermined and legal guarantees that protect 
individuals from state aggression are no longer upheld (UNDP 2003:155).  
 
Most Arab states have signed international conventions that protect freedom of association 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. And, with the exception single-party states and Saudi Arabia, which 
does not have a constitution per se, Arab states “endorse freedom” in their constitutions 
(UNDP 2003:153). Many have also introduced clauses that provide for the founding of 
associations and organizing general assemblies. But, the actual practice and protection of 
freedom of association in the Arab world is severely hindered by the erratic nature of the 
application of laws and the hegemony of political power. There is a failure in the region to 
“reconcile the interests of the government with the rights of the people and the exigencies of 
state security with the principles of freedom” (UNDP 2003:153-54).  
 
International conventions, then, have not entered the legal culture of Arab states or been 
incorporated into national legislation (UNDP 2003:152).4 Further, an independent and 
transparent judiciary is a fundamental guarantor in the protection of the freedom of 
association, and many Arab judiciaries are not independent of executive branches of 
government. 
 
There is also perhaps a lack of awareness on the part of governments with regard to the role 
and functioning of civil society organizations. Lisa Anderson notes that during the trial of 
Saadeddin Ibrahim, Egyptian sociologist and chair of the Ibn Khaldun Centre for 
Development Studies in Cairo, proceedings reflected a general lack of awareness of the role 
of research centres, with witnesses asked to clarify the role of a board of directors, program 
evaluations, audits, and external funding (Anderson 2004:7). Anderson quotes one analyst as 
noting that, “if it weren’t for foreign funding for scientific and social research in Egypt, we 
wouldn’t have any” (Anderson 2004:7). 
 
In terms of the right to join or form political parties, in the Gulf states political parties are 
banned, with Yemen being the exception. Political parties operate informally in Kuwait. In 
the Middle East and North Africa, there has been a proliferation of political parties in the 
last two decades, and a history of political party activism. Nonetheless, political parties face 
legal and political constraints that seriously limit their ability to mobilize and attain political 
power. Some of these constraints are discussed below (see also Appendix B for regional 
overview of political and governmental mechanisms).  
 
In sum, the right to join and form associations in the region is highly constrained. As noted 
by May Kassem, in the Arab world generally the weakness of civil society is closely linked to 
the authoritarian nature of political systems in the region (Kassem 2004:87). The following 
                                                 
4 The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees freedom of association and 
defines the parameters within which governments can restrict or regulate NGOs. Articles 20 and 21 guarantee 
the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association and stipulate they can be restricted only when 
restriction is lawful and serves legitimate interests in national security, public safety, public morals or health, or 
the rights or freedoms of others. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is also widely accepted and states 
that everyone has a right to “freedom of peaceful assembly and association” and that no one can be compelled 
to join an association (Simon 1999:2). See also Carolina Rodriguez Bello’s paper which outlines in more detail 
relevant human rights mechanisms (Bello n.d.).  
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sections outline discussions in the literature on the roles and efficacy of civil societies, 
political parties, and Islamic NGOs and movements in democratic development.  
 
 
Assessing the efficacy of civil societies: 
 
Freedom of association, the right to join associations without interference from the state, 
enables the development of citizen organizations and movements that function as conduits 
between individuals and the state—in other words, civil society. But, the precise definition of 
civil society remains contentious. In addition, ascertaining the conditions that are necessary 
for its survival in the context of the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf, is rife with 
assumptions about the nature of democratic change, the effectiveness of democratic state 
reforms and liberalization, and the role of religion in public life. For example, some  
definitions of civil society are also not reconcilable with Islamic organizations or movements 
(Kamali 2001:457).  These issues in the literature are brought out in the discussion below.  
 
In general terms, civil society is widely viewed as: “the zone of voluntary associative life 
beyond family and clan affiliations but separate from the state and the market” (Hawthorne 
2004:5, n2). Augustus Richard Norton suggests this would include clubs, guilds, syndicates, 
federations, unions, parties and groups that “come together to provide a buffer between the 
state and citizen” (Norton 1995:7). Religious organizations, advocacy and interest groups, 
research institutions, as well as informal political, social, and religious movements are also 
viewed as within the realm of civil society. For Amy Hawthorne, the media and political 
parties are not part of civil society (Hawthorne 2004:5). Nonetheless, political parties, 
government institutions (such as an independent judiciary), and legal frameworks that enable 
or constrain freedom of association and freedom of expression remain important factors in 
assessing the efficacy of civil societies.  
 
Norton’s assertion that “if democracy—as it is known in the West—has a home, it is in civil 
society” (Norton 1995:7) is reflected in much of the literature that examines civil society in 
the context of transitions to democracy. Civil society organizations are seen as “building 
blocks for a future democratic state and society” (Clark 1995:167; see also Keane 1988:407-
430). Individual rights and democratic practices are seen as growing from an established civil 
society (Davis, pending 2006). In the context of Iraq, support to civil society is seen as a 
means of healing the social effects of prolonged political repression and contributing to 
peace building and conflict resolution (see Sheikhany 2000:n.p.).   
 
Nonetheless, there is a lack of systematic analysis that measures the correlation between 
democracy and civil society (see Abootalebi 1998). The assumption of an automatic link 
between civil societies and processes of democratization is being revisited in studies that 
attempt to grapple with the slow and contradictory results accruing from two decades of 
donor support to civil society institutions in developing countries. There are also calls to 
widen conceptualizations of civil society beyond organizational activism. Mass protests, 
community activism, what is termed “social Islamism” and quiet encroachment (illegal 
means of gaining access to local resources) are examined in trying to understand the loci and 
forces of social and political change (see, for instance, Bayat 2002; Sadiki 2000). Diane 
Singerman and A. Bayat examine, respectively, the informal networks in Cairo and the ways 
in which squatters, the unemployed, and street vendors activate passive networks in Iran 
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(Singerman 1995; Bayat 1997). Larbi Sadiki examines links between popular uprisings and 
democratization in Jordan and Sudan (Sadidi 2000).  
 
These studies attempt to identify forces of change and democratic openings. Sadiki, for 
example, contends that food protest was a “leading factor” in democratic reform in Sudan 
and Jordan at different times (Sadiki 2000:75). She suggests there is a “strong correlation” 
between anti-government khubz (bread) riots and political liberalizations in Sudan (1985), 
Algeria (1988), and Jordan (1989), despite the fact that the resulting political reforms were 
carried out by the states as a means of manipulating the public and defusing crises of 
legitimacy (Sadiki 2000:88-89). In Algeria, civil society during the 1980s is seen to have 
played a part in political liberalization but Entelis contends that pressure from below in the 
form of bread riots were instrumental in bridging the gap between independent civil society 
organizations and closed state institutions (Entelis 1996:50).  
 
Notwithstanding the importance of closely examining different forms of civil protest for 
democratization openings, it is clear from the literature that whether one defines civil 
societies narrowly or more broadly, they have not led to democratization in the Arab world 
(see Hawthorne 2004:10). Civil societies have proliferated in some countries of the Arab 
world as a result of top-down liberalization but, despite wide hopes, they are not a causal 
factor in the liberalization that has taken place (Hawthorne 2004:10). In several countries, 
the emergence of civil society organizations such as human rights organizations has resulted 
in increased restrictions established by states on the work and autonomy of NGOs. Naomi 
Sakr’s study of civil society, media and accountability in the Arab world purports that 
extremely tight restrictions on nongovernmental organizations “have been introduced in 
reaction to the emergence of civil society groups” (Sakr 2002:11).  
 
Julia Pitner highlights the increasing aggressiveness with which governments in the region 
are attempting to undermine and discredit NGO efforts, targeting human rights NGOs in 
particular (Pitner 2005:2). Suppression and cooptation are the two means by which states 
restrict the ability of NGOs to contest political power. In the words of Albrecht and 
Schlumberger, 
Nongovernmental organizations as independent agents of the aggregation and 
articulation of societal interests have been transformed into tools of co-optative 
control. True, some nonprofit organizations have initially gone largely unnoticed 
both by Arab regimes and Western donors. Yet, as soon as such organizations try to 
aggregate and articulate interests autonomously, the regimes usually suppress or co-
opt them and their leaders (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:383). 
 
Co-optation is achieved through legislation such as that being considered in Jordan, Lebanon 
and Palestine which will enable the states and Palestinian Authority to monitor foreign 
funding of NGOs (Egypt already has legislation in place in that regard) (Pitner 2005:4). 
Indeed, as Albrecht and Schlumberger point out, “in no other region have trade unions, 
syndicates, and professional associations been penetrated as deeply and profoundly by 
authoritarian rule as in the Arab world” (Albrecht and Schlumberger 204:386). Pitner and 
others also highlight the imposition of bureaucratization and international funders’ agendas 
on NGOs as a factor in hampering the responsiveness of NGOs to local needs and 
concerns (Pitner 2005:4). 
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Another means of co-optation is the creation by states of parallel organizations that 
resemble independent NGOs (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:383; Pitner 2005:2). For 
example, the Tunisian government created Jeune Medecine sans Frontières and various 
other ‘sans Frontiere’ organizations that attempt to get invited to international human rights 
conferences; at the same time, the Tunisian government denies travel visas to representatives 
of legitimate NGOs (Pitner 2005:2). 
 
Civil societies in the Arab world have not, then, been able to stave off authoritarianism or 
affect the balance of power (Hawthorne 2004:10). Egypt provides a case in point. In 1999, 
Law 153 came into force there and was invalidated in 2002. But, despite an NGO campaign, 
in June 2002, a revised, more restricted version of the law was passed by the People’s 
Assembly. It was seen as a response by the government to NGO criticism of the state, and 
was more restrictive than its predecessor, Law No. 32. Under Law 153, all NGOs not 
officially registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs are illegal. Members of unauthorized 
organizations are deemed criminal offenders, and registered NGOs must fulfill numerous 
requirements, including accepting onto their board an official from the Ministry of Social 
Affairs, and refraining from all activities of a ‘political nature.’ Also, all external funds must 
go through the Ministry of Social Affairs before dispensed to NGOs (Grunert 2003:140). 
And, membership in organizations or networks outside the country is prohibited without 
prior government permission. Donor institutions are also required to register with the 
Egyptian government (Grunert 2003:141,148; see also Langohr 2004:194-195, who notes the 
Egyptian government’s attempt, through Law 153, to legislate fewer restrictions on ‘good,’ 
that is apolitical, NGOs while tightening restrictions on oppositional advocacy 
organizations).  
 
In Egypt, as elsewhere in the Arab world, civil society organizations must devote a great deal 
of energy to secure their own future as they remain vulnerable to state interference (Sakr 
2002:12-13). Nonetheless, and despite the fact that donors themselves are hampered by 
restrictive legislation (see Grunert with regard to Egypt, 2003:143), civil societies in the Arab 
world have a particular appeal to international donors as they are assumed to play a vital role 
in the difficult challenge of promoting democracy (Hawthorne 2004:5). The concept of civil 
society also has significance for Arab societies and is intensely debated as it represents, in 
Sara Roy’s words, “an attempt on the part of the Arab citizen to deal with the issues of 
political repression and personal oppression” (Roy 1996:221)  
 
Hawthorne notes that donors wrongly assume that civil societies are apolitical. Hawthorne 
also contends that as a concept, civil society is defined too narrowly as comprising nonprofit 
organizations that resemble those in donors’ own countries. Religious organizations, social 
movements, and non-NGO forms of associative life (such as those mentioned above) tend 
to be downplayed or ignored by donors (Hawthorne 2004:5, 14). Also sometimes 
overlooked is the fact that civil society organizations are not inherently supportive of 
democratic change. As Hawthorne states,  
Civil society organizations are not inherently counterhegemonic or liberal; 
particularly in authoritarian environments, civil society can be dominated by 
apolitical, progovernment, or even illiberal groups that fulfill roles other than 
democratization (Hawthorne 2004:11). 
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Hence, as John Entelis states, it is quite possible to have a viable, even dynamic, civil society 
without having any progress toward the formation of autonomous political organizations 
that are able to challenge the hegemony of state power. The growth of civil society, then, is 
not sufficient “to guarantee the emergence of either political liberalism or political 
democracy” (Entelis 1996:47). Similarly, Masoud Kamali contends that individualism or 
democratic institutions are not necessary for civil society (Kamali 2001:458).  
 
Thus, precisely how or whether the promotion of civil society is meant to lead to democracy 
is a contentious issue. In the Philippines, Latin America, and Eastern European countries, 
civil societies have articulated democratic alternatives to the status quo, promoted and 
disseminated democratic values of participation and collective action, carved out 
independent political space, spread the idea of democracy within society, and mobilized 
millions of citizens against repressive regimes (Hawthorne 2004:5). Civil society 
organizations in these regions managed to maintain a degree of autonomy that enabled them 
to emerge as a challenge to the ruling power (see Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:386).  
 
The important factor of autonomy does not exist for civil society organizations in the Arab 
world. There are non-co-opted Islamist groups (discussed below) but other than these, 
“there are absolutely no social forces with significant organizational capacities that could be 
said to be independent from their respective regimes in terms of finance, organization, and 
personnel” (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:386). The efficacy of civil societies is limited 
by the lack of respect for social autonomy and acceptance of dissention on the part of states 
in the region (Al-Sayyid 1995:271). 
 
With an important qualification, Hawthorne asserts that civil society can contribute to 
democratization of authoritarian regimes and help sustain newly established democratic 
systems under the right conditions (Hawthorne 2004:5, n3). In order for civil society to have a 
democratizing effect in authoritarian contexts--be able to act as a counterweight to state 
power and shape social attitudes--a critical mass of organizations and movements must have 
three attributes. These are autonomy from the regime, a pro-democracy agenda, and the 
ability to build coalitions with other sectors of civil society and other forces such as political 
parties, to push for democratic change. Civil society in the Arab world does not yet have 
these attributes (Hawthorne 2004:5, 11).  
 
Rather, ruling regimes in the Arab world manipulate the system to their own advantage. As 
Ehtashami notes, they: 
Apply the law to regulate access to levers of power, and to control participation of 
political forces. They, in effect, use the civil law to exert control of the political 
process. Unchecked, such practices can easily transform a transitional step towards 
democracy into an ‘elected authoritarian’ regime in which elections become no more 
than a hollow shell for disguising de-liberalization (Ehtashami 2004:102). 
 
This risk is particularly apparent in the absence of true multiparty systems. Pro-democracy 
groups tend to lobby through personal contacts in government, and do not have broad 
popular support in the Arab world. Civil society groups such as trade unions, professional 
syndicates, and chambers of commerce and industry (as well as political parties, as discussed 
below) focus on access to decision-makers rather than on being forums for competing 
programs or ideas (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:383).  
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Weak and fragmented civil societies in the Arab world are only partly a result of regimes’ 
repression and manipulation. They also stem from a lack of shared vision and a deep 
polarization between those who wish to Islamicize society and those who see civil society as 
the way to ward against this (see Hawthorne 2004:13), as described below. Thus, in addition 
to the constraints presented by the socio-political context in which civil societies emerge and 
function, civil society organizations themselves are often reluctant to take actions that could 
jeopardize their precarious status. As a result, the ability of civil societies in the Arab world 
to promote democracy and challenge the political status quo is largely nonexistent in the 
region (Hawthorne 2004:13).  
 
Another argument in the literature with regard to the success of civil societies to promote 
democracy asserts the importance of the democratic functioning and ideologies of 
organizations. Janine Astrid Clark’s analysis of Islamic health clinics in Cairo illustrates how 
the clinics have been seen by analysts as potentially fulfilling a “bottom-up” role in national 
processes of democratization. This assumption stems in part from the fact that these clinics 
foster greater informal participation than their non-Islamic counterparts. But, crucially, “they 
are not providing the building blocks” for a democratic state or society as “Islamic clinics are 
not actively or consciously engaged in establishing any form of an alternative conception of 
state and society at the grassroots or national levels” (Clark 1995:167). Clark’s conclusion is 
echoed by Brynen, Korany, and Noble, who note that the “synergistic interconnections that 
democratic consolidation requires” is such that civil associations that are authoritarian are 
not in a position to inculcate values of democratic participation (Brynen, Korany and Noble 
1998:275). 
 
Hawthorne identifies five sectors of civil society in the Arab world. Islamic groups are the 
largest and most active sector. The second sector includes service organizations that provide 
loans, job training, educational assistance, and community development, which compliment 
or substitute for state services (Hawthorne 2004:7). The third sector includes membership-
based professional organizations such as labour unions, professional syndicates, and 
chambers of commerce. These provide economic and social services to their members and 
are among the largest NGOs in many Arab countries. The fourth sector are associations that 
aim to foster solidarity and provide services among neighbours, relatives and colleagues. 
These include artists’ and writers’ societies and youth organizations. In the Gulf countries, 
this sector also includes diwaniyyas, which are private gatherings of relatives, friends, and 
colleagues that serve as forums for socializing, conducting business and (to a limited extent) 
discussing politics. Unlike service organizations that are highly regulated by the government, 
these associations tend to be self-funded and have little relations with governments 
(Hawthorne 2004:7-8). 
 
The fifth sector is the newest and smallest and is most often thought of as making up ‘Arab 
civil society’ by outside promoters of democracy (Hawthorne 2004:8). These organizations 
are ‘pro-democracy’ organizations in that they seek to promote democratic change, carry out 
democracy education programs often targeted at marginalized groups such as women and 
youth, and press Arab governments to adhere to international democratic norms. They also 
mobilize citizens to vote, run for office, and observe elections; they fight corruption, 
research political issues, and lobby for changes in laws and government practices 
(Hawthorne 2004:8).  
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The existence of pro-democracy groups, functioning in a democratic nature, is not in itself 
sufficient to create bottom-up change. Hawthorne notes that particular factors are required 
to enable pro-democracy groups to challenge regimes. These include: economic growth 
which could lessen organizations’ financial dependence on regimes; charismatic leadership; 
access to the media; political liberalization of regimes; and the emergence of a liberal Islamic 
trend. A liberal Islamic trend could lead to coalitions across sectors. Currently, many states 
bolster Islamic groups as a counterweight to secular opposition groups, and vice versa 
(Hawthorne 2004:13-14). 
 
The nature and efficacy of civil society in the Arab world exists along a spectrum, at one end 
of which is Oman, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the UAE. A handful of civil society 
groups have emerged recently in Syria, though they have been repressed by the authorities. 
In general, these states prohibit the establishment of independent citizen organizations, 
allowing only state-run citizen organizations, Diwaniyyas, semiofficial Islamic charities, and 
quasi-official research institutes (Hawthorne 2004:8). Oil and gas wealth in the Gulf states 
noted above has removed the need for service NGOs and for foreign aid which has been a 
factor in their proliferation.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum are Kuwait, Bahrain, Yemen, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, 
Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinian territories. Autonomy from states is curbed in a 
number of ways in the region. Labour union leaders are appointed by the state; think tanks 
receive funding from the state; and, more nefariously, Hawthorne notes, security services 
have created ‘nongovernmental’ organizations that duplicate the work of independent 
groups and evade detection of foreign donors who have difficulty telling the organizations 
apart (as noted above, with regard to Tunisia) (Hawthorne 2004:11; Pitner 2005:2). Most 
commonly, regimes have neutralized groups by threats of repression or the removal of 
funding and political protection (Hawthorne 2004:11).  
 
As a result, the priorities of most unions, professional associations, and mutual aid societies 
focus on their members’ interests rather than activism (Hawthorne 2004:12). Informal 
groups do resist state power in the Arab world (as noted above), but their informality makes 
them ineffective in garnering broad support. By contrast, service NGOs and community 
groups in South Africa, the Philippines and many Latin American countries were able to 
pursue the dual goals of development and democratic political change and mobilized the 
public to both ends (Hawthorne 2004:12). The following table presents an overview of the 




Table 1: Civil Society Trajectory 
 
 
Oman, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the UAE 
- states prohibit the establishment of independent citizen organizations; civil society 
consists of Diwaniyyas, semiofficial Islamic charities, quasi-official research institutes 
(Nonetheless, Qatar has stood firm in hosting Al Jazeera satellite television channel, 





- a smattering of NGO Islamic societies, professional associations, 
clubs and pro-democracy groups 
(In Bahrain, Muntada Forum, a group of liberal intellectuals and businessmen, 
Bahrain Centre for Human Rights (BCHR), General Organization for Youth and 




- very large service NGOs and a few labour unions and professional associations; a 
few pro-democracy groups exist but suffer state harassment and have a precarious 
legal status; Islamic organizations are tied to the government (as a result of the 
government’s attempts eradicate an Islamic opposition movement and other 
independent Islamic activity) 
 
 
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen 
- civil society activity across all five sectors, including active, independent, opposition, 
and government-connected Islamic organizations; professional associations, mutual 
aid societies and a small number of pro-democracy groups 
- The independence of NGOs is questionable though 
Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen are recipients of large amounts of foreign aid to large 




Morocco, Lebanon, Palestinian Territories 
- many diverse and active civil society organizations. In Morocco this is due to a long 
history of political pluralism; war and occupation in Lebanon and Palestine 
contributed to political pluralism, expressed in associational life.  






Iraq, Iran and Turkey are not included in the above summary but are described below. 
Briefly, in Iraq, there are numerous religious and secular organizations forming, and 150 
newspapers encouraging debate and galvanizing participation. Iraq’s tradition of 
industrialization and secularism provided a context which favoured a powerful labour 
movement. The 1971 labour code was pro-union and conformed with ILO conventions. In 
1979, the unions became a front for the government (many former GFTU leaders executed 
or imprisoned and many fled into exile). A new labour code in 1987 removed the right of 
public sector employees to form trade unions. After Saddam Hussein’s regime fell, trade 
unionists in exile began to return; those imprisoned were freed, and others emerged from 
working underground. Moves are underway by union activists to rebuild the Iraqi trade 
union movement. In addition to the union confederations, there are large and active 
professional associations in Iraq and Kurdistan of teachers, journalists, doctors and lawyers. 
 
Civil society in Kurdistan was marked, until 1991, by a complete lack of associational 
networks independent of the state. Any social, cultural, or political organization in Iraq that 
did not reflect the regime’s ideology was forbidden. With the resettlement of Kurds in 1991, 
NGOs took the form of relief services such as health centres, schools, and food distribution. 
A lack of capacity or experience, though, meant that corruption and the diversion of funds 
were common; NGOs competed for donor funds and adopted donor agendas (Sheikhany 
2000:n.p.). In 1996, many donors withdrew their support and many local NGOs 
disappeared. There is mutual suspicion surrounding NGO, donor, and wider community 
relations, although the role of NGOs has contributed to the limited grown of civil society 
amongst Kurds. Sheikhany calls for the international community to support the rebuilding of 
civil society along with reconciling conflicts between Kurdish political parties (Sheikhany 
2000:n.p.).  
 
Iran has a long history of a strong civil society. Recently, a ‘new generation’ of NGOs 
emerged that address women’s issues, the environment, children, health and training (Sayyah 
2003). Kazemi notes that “in spite of all regime attempts to control civil society and 
undermine institutions of reform, the final outcome is not necessarily determined” (Kazemi 
2003:92). Women and youth are seen as the critical catalysts of any future pro-democracy 
movement. Youth are not organized in opposition to the regime, though women’s groups 
proliferate. Indeed, the large middle class in Iran and women’s increasing levels of education 
mean that women are set to play a potentially important role in civil society and reform 
movements into the future (Moghadam 2004:464).   
 
Turkey is unique in the region in that its supreme court decisions give precedence to 
international conventions on human rights over Turkish law, which is itself being massively 
overhauled to meet EU eligibility criteria. 
 
It is clear from the literature that the democratizing role of civil societies is vital and 
necessary. But, as noted above, various factors contribute to the limited efficacy of civil 
societies. While many studies focus on attributes of civil societies themselves, others point to 
conditions in the wider polity that are key to the efficacy of civil societies. The following 
section examines more closely some of the conceptual links made by analysts between civil 




Links between civil society, political parties, and democratization: 
 
Notably, the literature on civil societies assumes the existence of a state, and a state that is 
bound by law (Roy 1996:223). Civil society also “regards pluralism as a ‘primary good,’ 
extolling difference and diversity” (Roy 1996:223). It assumes a common set of values, and 
social behaviour guided by an ethical vision of social life, and the valuation and protection of 
individual rights (Roy 1996:223). The extent to which these conditions exist and are adhered 
varies considerably between states in the region. For one, as Sara Roy points out, the 
assumption of a state does not exist in the West Bank and Gaza, and the conditions that 
enable and constrain autonomous organizations differ markedly between the West Bank and 
Gaza (Roy 1996:228).  
 
Increasingly, it is these wider conditions that are drawing the attention of analysts. For 
example, Albrecht and Schlumberger usefully examine the particularities of authoritarianism 
for insight into how autonomy of NGOs is rendered impossible (Albrecht and Schlemberger 
2004). There is a great need, the authors argue, for in-depth case studies of the mechanisms, 
institutions, and relations that maintain authoritarian states (Albrecht and Schlumberger 
2004). More broadly still, Carapaco highlights the confluence of international factors that 
contribute to both “the NGO phenomena” and its limited efficacy. Specifically, she notes, 
there is the correspondence between support for civil society and the privatization 
orthodoxy of macroeconomic and national reforms (such as those crafted by the IMF and 
implemented by Arab states) (Carapico 2000). The ways in which this correspondence 
affects, and potentially threatens, the efficacy of ‘bottom-up’ approaches of civil societies is 
pointed out as increasingly pertinent in the context of globalization of economies and 
political influences. (For example, policies that promote a decrease in public spending on 
education and health care, also promote the proliferation of civil society organizations, 
which are seen as being able to fill the resultant gap in social spending.) 
 
Several critiques assert the need to examine the links between civil society and political 
institutions (see Goodson and Radwan 1997; Hawthorne 2004:14; and Abootalebi 1998), 
and political parties themselves as agents of democratization (see Doherty 2001 and Langohr 
2004). Hawthorne calls for a shift in focus away from civil societies and toward the 
relationship of different parts of civil society to citizens and governments (Hawthorne 
2004:14). And Ali Abootalebi contends that: 
The literature on democracy and democratization has paid scant attention to the 
state’s crucial role vis-à-vis its society. The socioeconomic requisites for democracy 
are often emphasized, but the distribution of power resources among social groups, 
and the degree of concentration of power in the state relative to the society has been 
given less attention (Abootalebi 1998:n.p.). 
 
Ivan Doherty, former general secretary of the Fine Gael Party in Ireland, and director of 
political party programs at the National Democratic Institute, argues greater attention needs 
to be paid political parties and parliaments themselves, which are the forums that must 
ultimately address the interests of those very civil society groups (Doherty 2001).  Kassem 
also contends that the role of political parties in integrating and assimilating various social 
forces in society renders them important means by which political development and stability 
are achieved (Kassem 2004:49). 
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Doherty points out, also, that the reluctance of funders of international development 
programs to address the needs of political party organizations ultimately threatens “the 
democratic equilibrium” of societies in transition from authoritarian to democratic political 
systems. He states: 
Many private and public donors feel that it is more virtuous to be a member of a 
civic organization than a party and that participating in party activity must wait until 
there is a certain level of societal development. There is a grave danger in such an 
approach. Strengthening civic organizations, which represent the demand side of the 
political equation, without providing commensurate assistance to the political 
organizations that must aggregate the interests of those very groups, ultimately 
damages the democratic equilibrium (Doherty 2001:25).  
 
Vickie Langohr’s study is noteworthy in that she purports that both NGOs and political 
parties “should be seen as part of a larger topography of opposition” (Langohr 204:182). 
Langohr argues that for nongovernmental organizations to take on the role of primary 
opposition within Arab societies in fact decreases the chances for democratization. She 
explains thus: 
These organizations generally advocate the interests of a specific group or the 
importance of a particular principle, such as respect for human rights, making them 
ill-equipped to mobilize a much broader set of constituencies around the larger goal 
of regime change. Perhaps most important, as groups almost entirely dependent on 
foreign funding, they often have strong support abroad but shallow roots at home, 
allowing them to be more easily discredited by hostile governments than parties 
would be…it is time for scholarly and policy analysis of Arab democratization to 
focus less on nongovernmental organizations and more on the importance of 
developing viable political parties (Langohr 2004:182).  
 
Notably, political parties and other mass organizations have not been a proven means of 
gaining control of governments in the region and in some cases regimes have not felt the 
need for political parties to maintain control. In other cases, mass political involvement is 
met by repression (Tachau 1994:xv). Nonetheless, political parties attempt to (or at least 
claim to, as noted below) represent the masses. And their proliferation in the region in recent 
years has contributed to a greater focus on them as agents of democratization. The following 
section draws on literatures on political parties in the Arab world, Iran, and Turkey for 
insight into trends and developments. 
 
 
Political parties in the Middle East and North Africa: 
 
Political parties are associated with democratic political systems and, generally speaking, 
“parties of whatever type, in whatever kind of system, regardless of the specific tactics they 
employ, strive to—or at least claim to—represent the masses” (Tachau 1994:xiii-xiv). In the 
politics of states in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf, the role of the masses as 
been poorly institutionalized. The populace has played only a peripheral role in the political 
systems of the region (Tachau 1994:xv). But, parties can and do function in environments 
that are not democratic. Not surprisingly, given the repressive and nonconsensual forms of 
political systems in the Middle East and North Africa, political parties take a variety of forms 
(Tachau 1994:xxvi).  
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Two trends can be identified, and these are that political parties have proliferated in the 
Middle East and North Africa in the last two decades. And support for nationalist parties 
has waned and been eclipsed by Islamist parties, which are now the region’s most dynamic 
political parties (see Tachau 1994). The increasing support for Islamist parties has also 
coincided with a shift in opposition politics away from leftist parties and toward religious 
movements or organizations.  
 
Political parties are seen to have four characteristics: continuity or longevity; operating locally 
but institutionally linked to national level; a drive to seek government power, either alone or 
in coalition; and the objective of popular support (LaPalombara and Weiner 1966; cited in 
Tachau 1994:xiii). Political parties in the Arab world do not always have these characteristics 
and their roles have been varied. (While a distinction is made between political parties and 
factions, Palestinian factions of the PLO function as political parties and are treated as such 
in the literature (Tachau 1994:xix).) 
 
Political parties have been instrumental in mobilizing liberation movements and leading the 
struggle for independence (Turkey,s Republican People’s Party, Algeria’s National Liberation 
Front, the Wafd in Egypt, the Dustur and Neo-Dustur in Tunisia, and the Istiqlal in Morocco) 
(Tachau 1994:xvi). Many regimes are dominated by secular nationalist parties such as Syria, 
Libya, Egypt and, until recently, Iraq). Lebanese parties are most often identified with religo-
ethnic groups, and those which appear to be secular in ideology often have a membership 
base that is clearly sectarian (Tachau 1994:298). 
 
Kuwaiti parties are sometimes characterized as ‘proto-parties’ as they are severely 
constrained. The newest parties to gain popular followings are, as mentioned above, those 
carrying the banner of resurgent Islam (Tachau 1994:xvi). The Muslim Brotherhood and 
smaller Islamic groups in Egypt and Jordan are constrained in the ways they can participate 
in the political process. Although the 1989 Jordanian elections resulted in sizable gains in the 
national parliament by Muslim Brotherhood candidates (Tachau 1994:xvii-xviii). Communist 
parties have also played significant roles in the region, though they have weakened with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  
 
The roles of political parties in the Middle East and North Africa are shaped by certain 
particularities of the region. These include the fragility of states, and a lack of consensus 
regarding the identity of states (whether it should be pan-Arab, Islamist, or secular, for 
example). Pan-Arabism, now in decline, produced chapters of pan-Arab parties in various 
states. And Islamist parties and movements straddle national boundaries (such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood with chapters in Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Palestine) (Tachau 1994:xvii-xviii). 
Another characteristic of the region that shapes the form and role of political parties is the 
strong loyalty to ethnic, tribal, clan, sectarian, and zu’ama’ (leader). In the context of the long-
standing authority structure of patrimonialism, along with pre-existing patron-client 
relationships, the political party can reinforce traditional relationships. As Tachau notes,  
The party thus becomes a new political instrument of traditional local notables; or, 
alternatively, the party serves to rechannel a set of traditional relationships. This 
phenomenon is particularly evident in Lebanon and in the more traditional regions 
of Turkey, as well as throughout the Arab world and in Iran (Tachau 1994:xx).  
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In attempting to understand the relative popularity and efficacy of parties and movements, it 
is useful to examine how well parties function as conduits between the government and 
masses. In this regard, Ellen M. Lust-Okar’s research on Jordanian political parties helpfully 
distinguishes between the strength of parties themselves and the strength of the political-
party system. While the first component, party strength, refers to the ability of parties to 
legislate and implement policies, the second component, the strength of the political-party 
system determines whether political parties can be active partners in policy-making. The 
strength of the political-party system, then, is critical in determining how well parties can 
function as conduits between the government and the masses (Lust-Okar:2001:545).  
 
Both strong parties and strong political-party systems are necessary for the prospects of 
democratization (Lust-Okar 2001:547). Lust-Okar notes that, 
Ideally, political parties play an important role in governance by transmitting public 
preferences to the government. When they successfully join government, political-
party elites are also important participants in the formulation of policies. Finally, 
parties play an important role in expressing and promoting government policies to 
the people. In short, effective political parties enhance the communication between 
the masses and the government, and they should play an active role in shaping 
government policies (Lust-Okar 2001:546). 
 
Jordanian parties in the 1950s and 1990s failed to play this role. Martial law was imposed in 
the interim and political parties were banned. About 90 parties applied to register for official 
status in 1991 (Tachau 1994:267). Links between the parties and the masses were weak both 
in the 1950s and the 1990s. Moreover, “political liberalization in Jordan was a defensive 
move, intended to shore up the monarchy, it was not a reaction to the pressures of already 
well-mobilized political parties” (Lust-Okar 2001:546). Jordanian parties, though apparently 
in decline, have not experienced a significant change in terms of their effectiveness in acting 
as a conduit between the public and the palace (Lust-Okar:2001:546).  
 
Morocco provides another noteworthy ‘case’ in examining the efficacy of political parties. 
Despite dozens of parties active in its parliament since 1977, they could not turn their 
political strength into real power. The monarchy remains central and the political system 
“malleable” (Tachau 1994:394). This was illustrated by the 1993 elections, which resulted in 
significant gains by opposition parties. The king invited the parties into government but 
stipulated that the major positions of prime minister, minister of the interior, and minister of 
foreign affairs would not be open to them. The parties chose to boycott the government 
entirely, leaving their ability to mobilize in question (Tachau 1994:396-97). Tachau notes 
that, 
So long as Morocco continues to have a king as its actual head of state, he will 
undoubtedly continue the long-standing strategy of using parties as legitimizing 
mechanisms with limited autonomy and mobilizational capacity (Tachau 1994:394).  
 
Marginalization of political parties and restrictions on their real powers means they often 
function underground and in opposition to the government. For example, from the 1970s to 
90s, opposition parties worked underground with the goal of overthrowing the Qadhafi 
regime. Tachau notes that there is also a history of factionalism and fragility of political 
community in the region which has spawned deep-rooted distrust of political parties as they 
are seen as a threat to national solidarity and integrity (Tachau 1994:xxiii). The public appeal 
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of secular parties is weak, and they are perceived to be corrupt and/or co-opted by the 
government. Mass mobilization and protests are often unconnected to political party 
strength and organization. Other factors have brought people to the streets (with regard to 
Jordan see Lust-Okar 2001:553-54). 
 
Like civil societies, political parties require an amenable context in order to place their 
representatives in government. This context is a competitive multiparty system (Kassem 
2004:49). But, in the region, the opening up of political systems toward creating 
multipartyism has been at times a means by the regime to stave off crises or luttes de clans, 
such as was the case in Algeria in 1989 (Tachau 1994:20). Another factor that enables 
opposition parties to gain enough seats to participate in government is proportional 
representation, “a long-term demand of most Arab oppositions that is almost never granted” 
(Langohr 2004:189-190).  
 
Restrictions and constraints abound on the formation of parties. As a result, some political 
parties have formed NGOs and put their concerns forward through civil society activism. In 
other instances, parties have formed NGOs (see Langohr 2004:191-192, with regard to the 
Palestinian context). Goodson and Radwan note that opposition parties are often weak, 
poorly organized and internally authoritarian (Goodson and Radwan 1997:7). Their popular 
base is often severely restricted. Exceptions include regional parties, for example Iran’s 
Kurdish and Azerbijani parties, which do represent their constituencies’ concerns. Regional 
parties (such as the Kurdish and Azerbaijan in Iran, and the Berber party in Algeria) are also 
more connected to their constituencies than are ruling and secular opposition parties 
(Tachau 1994:140). 
 
Opposition parties in Morocco, Yemen and Algeria won over 30 percent of parliamentary 
seats in the 1990s (Langohr 2004:188). Opposition parties in Egypt, Tunisia, and Palestine 
are weaker and win fewer seats in parliament. In terms of how to account for why 
opposition parties manage to win significant numbers of seats in some regimes and not in 
others, Langohr suggests that different types of authoritarian regimes allow for different 
types of oppositional participation. Liberalizing monarchies such as Morocco and Jordan 
derive their legitimacy from the perception they are above politics. They thus allow large 
numbers of smaller parties that they can manage (Langohr 2004:189).   
 
Considerable representation of opposition parties in Algeria was the result, notes Langohr, 
of the adoption of proportional representation; and Algeria remains the only presidential 
system where there is significant representation by opposition parties (Langohr 2004:190).  
In each of these countries, though, opposition parties have little legislative influence. 
Electoral fraud, outright repression of candidates, and limited access to the media and the 
public are contributing factors to weak opposition parties (Langohr 2004:188).  
 
Three other factors play in important role in the weakness of opposition parties in the 
region, according to Langohr, and these are incomplete parliamentarization, the prevalence 
of independent candidacy among nonruling party candidates, and financial fragility (Langohr 
2004:189). Incomplete parliamentarization refers to deviations from parliamentary procedure 
or obstruction of elected representatives in parliament. These practices, Langohr notes, 
undermine the influence of opposition parties.  
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Most opposition seats are won by independents or by Islamist parties, while secular 
opposition parties generally win very few seats in parliaments in the region. The prevalence 
of independent candidates means that party programs and alternative programs to the ruling 
parties are not developed (Langohr 2004:189). Independent candidacy, Langohr notes, is 
both a cause and effect of weak opposition parties. In some instances, candidates are 
committed to opposing the regime but are not inspired by existing opposition parties. 
Because of the difficulty in attaining party registration, they run as independents. In other 
instances, independents are simply influential or popular individuals who are interested in 
gaining a parliamentary seat but not interested in contributing to an alternative political 
program (Langohr 2004:191). In the latter instance, candidates are often then co-opted into 
the ruling party (see Kasem 2004, with regard to Egypt).  
 
Financial fragility of parties stems largely from the disconnection of parties from upper class 
interests and contrasts with the relative abundance of funding available to nongovernmental 
organizations (Langohr 2004:191).  
  
Restrictions faced by opposition parties serves to render them ineffective, which has 
contributed to widespread disaffection and voter apathy. While Islamic movements face the 
most restrictions in terms of their participation in government, they are also the most 
responsive to the concerns of the population (in Egypt their response to the 1992 
earthquake in Cairo made this eminently apparent to the public and government alike).  
As a result, Islamist movements or parties have more appeal and are considered to have 
more integrity. Islamist movements and parties also benefit from being more connected to 
the everyday concerns of their constituents. Some, such as Hizbullah and al-Jama’ah al-
Islamiyyah in Lebanon, have been able to perform well in municipal elections after having 
built up strong constituencies through social welfare services (Hamzeh 2000:751). (This and 
other factors in their popular appeal are examined in more detail in the section below on 
Islamic movements and democratization.) 
 
Interestingly, Tachau notes that leftist parties have faced harsher measures from socialist 
secular ruling parties than from Islamist ones, which would seem to be their more obvious 
opponent (Tachau 1994:xviii-xix). Also, as mentioned above, alliances are forged pro-
democracy groups and parties and repressive regimes. These “dangerous alliances,” which 
are meant to stave off demands of Islamist groups, stall processes of political liberalization in 
the region (Hawthorne 2004:13; see also Garon 2003).  
 
 
Political participation in Gulf states: 
 
Gulf countries that have had parliamentary elections include Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and 
Oman. Only in Bahrain has there been parliamentary elections with universal suffrage (with 
the exception of the Bedouin who remain stateless). In Kuwait, only men vote in 
parliamentary elections and the electorate makes up only 17 percent of the population 
(Valenti 2003:1). In Qatar, there have only been municipal elections, with men and women 
voting in these. In Oman, parliamentary elections have been held with eligible male and 
female voters making up only 3 percent of the population (Valenti 2003:1). Despite some 
limited movement in terms of electoral politics, the regimes of the Gulf have been 
“unabashedly autocratic,” in Nathan Brown’s terms and, “with the exception of short 
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periods in Bahrain and longer periods in Kuwait, liberal democratic institutions and practices 
have generally not even existed on a nominal level” (Brown 1997:129).  
 
With the exception of Yemen, political parties are banned in the region, although they 
function informally in Kuwait. Full parliamentary democracy in Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain is 
not expected in the near future (Herb 2002:47). In fact, the limited democratization of 
governments in the Gulf, in the form of popular elections, has produced illiberal policies. 
Ruling families are generally more liberal than Islamists who stand to gain in electoral politics 
(Herb 2002:42). Abdullah Juma Alhaj’s piece on the Omani political elite provides an 
analysis of the challenges faced by Gulf states in general and the Omani political elite in 
particular. Specifically, the pace change, if too fast, can give rise to counter-modernization 
movements (Alhaj 2000:97-110). On the other hand, real democratic reform is also a 
demand of Islamist movements. For example, the largest Shiite group sat out the Bahraini 
2002 parliamentary elections, calling them a sham as the new parliament would have no 
power to legislate without the consent of the king (Sengupta 2002:n.p.). 
 
Herb suggests that Parliamentary life “does seem to promote some degree of moderation 
among Islamists” (Herb 2002:42). Parliamentary elections in the Gulf indicate that Islamists 
have a stake in defending the rights of association and the liberal freedoms of parliamentary 
life. The ruling families in the Gulf are very deeply ensconced, though, leaving little room for 
the exercise of real power by popularly elected representatives and little possibility, also, that 
parliamentary reform will lead to real legislative powers for elected bodies (Herb 2002:47). 
 
 
Islamic movements and democratization: 
 
Islamic groups are the largest and most active and widespread sector of associative life in the 
Arab world (Hawthorne 2004:6). But, their importance as civil society organizations and 
movements is not always understood. The growth of Islamic organizations and movements 
in the Middle East and North Africa can partly be understood in the context of failed 
modernization programs. When the land reform and industrialization of modernization 
programs failed, one of the un-planned results was urbanization. Poor farmers and 
agricultural workers migrated to cities and became marginalized urban poor. Their concerns 
were taken up not by the new civil society groups but by religious groups (Kamali 2001:471).  
 
Besides the lack of balanced socioeconomic development in the region, the rise of Islamic 
revivalist movements in the Middle East is also tied to other crises that beset the region, 
such as the Arab defeats by Israel and the “disorienting psychocultural impact” of 
Westernization (Hamzeh 1993). The victory of the Muslim cause in Iran gave further 
impetus to Islamic movements in the region (Hamzeh 1993). Abootalebi notes that,  
The popularity of Islam in the 1980s is largely a reflection of the bankruptcy of other 
alternatives posed to resolve social ills than some inevitable preference for 
authoritarianism or anti-democratic society. It is economic crisis, coupled with a 
crisis of legitimacy in most Muslim states, that has encouraged and strengthened 
religious opposition (Aboutalebi 1998:n.p.). 
In this context, Islamic movements have replaced nationalist parties in the Arab world as the 
most dynamic political groups. But, like secular parties, they are usually restricted through 
legislation and political institutions from exercising real political power. Authors note that 
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these restrictions which have precluded effective public participation, together with the 
brutal repression of political protests and the, contributed to both public apathy and the 
growth of Muslim extremism in the region. In Ghalioun’s words,  
the system was locked down so tightly that the forces of contestation had no choice 
other than letting themselves be crushed or becoming insurgents against the order 
that was oppressing them. If the vast bulk of the population has resigned itself to 
staying out of politics, other parties—a minority to be sure—have not hesitated to 
take up arms in order to topple the established order in the name of a more just 
order (Ghalioun 2002:130).  
 
Ghalioun and others discount the argument that Arab ‘culture’ explains the upsurge of 
violence on the part of Islamic insurgents. Rather, the failure of Arab democratization 
movements in the 1980s, “gave birth to the Islamist fundamentalist tidal wave” and the 
defeats of those movements led to armed extremist Islamism (Ghalioun 2002:120).  
 
Islamist groups have made inroads into several Arab governments. Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, 
Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, and Kuwait have had Islamist groups as leading 
opposition parties (Hamzeh 2000:740). Tachau notes that although Islamist parties had not 
gained more than 15 percent of electoral votes in these countries (by the mid-1990s), their 
“very presence on the spectrum of political parties has undoubtedly served to pull other 
formally secular parties somewhat in their direction” (Tachau 1994:xxi). In Palestine, Hamas 
“seems to” have accepted the trade-off of arms for parliamentary seats, and has fully 
participated in the debate on a revised election law prior to the presidential election of this 
year (Shikaki 2004:59-61).  
 
The resurgence of Islamist movements in the 1980s was more marked in countries in which 
the regime failed to develop a mass base, the police became prominent in controlling the 
citizenry, and the masses did not benefit from economic prosperity (Richards and Waterbury 
1990:432-33; cited in Rachau 1994:xxi). The popularity of Islamist movements and parties in 
the region is attributed less to “an upsurge of piety” than to “intense dissatisfaction with the 
perceived flaws and failures of existing regimes” (Tachau 1994:xxi). Islamist parties and 
movements are widely supported because they are viewed as effective vehicles for expressing 
frustration and despair. Islam, also, is the only major political doctrine that is indigenous and 
cannot be labeled as ‘foreign’ and can, thus, more persuasively claim ‘authenticity’ in the 
search for political identity (Tachau 1994:xxi).  
 
In Jordan, a shift in popular support for Islamist movements occurred in the mid-1980s, at a 
time when political parties were banned (Tachau 1994:266-67). In Lebanon, the conditions 
that influence the political participation of Islamist movements is examined by Nizar 
Hamzeh in several studies (Hamzeh 2001; Hamzeh 2000; Hamzeh 1994; Hamzeh 1993; 
Hamzeh and Dekmejian 1996). One of his conclusions is that Islamist groups that provide 
social welfare services to their communities are more likely to become involved in local 
politics than those who do not provide such services. Secondly, a federal system in which 
municipalities enjoy autonomy is more favourable to Islamist groups than one in which 
municipalities are controlled by the central government. The third point, which is echoed in 
the work of May Kassem with regard to the Egyptian context, is that the more intense the 
political, social and economic crises, and the more repressive the actions of the government 
against Islamists, the greater the likelihood that Islamists are to resort to violence (Hamzeh 
 25
2000:741; Kassem 2004). Kassem suggests, further, that the less critical the political, social 
and economic crises, and the more that Islamists are coopted by the regime, the less likely 
Islamist groups are to resort to violent means (Kassem 2004).  
 
Similarly, Lisa Anderson notes that “The absence of a reliable, transparent institutional 
framework for political opposition to work within not only hampers the routinization of 
opposition of all kinds but magnifies the profile and broadens the constituency of 
‘rejectionist’ or ‘disloyal’ parties” (Anderson 1997:19). Again with regard to Egypt, Kassem 
asserts that the ‘rejectionist’ approach of the political system and the repressive tactics of 
suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Jama’ al-Islamiya, and other Islamist groups, is 
“largely responsible for the prevailing Islamist challenge that contemporary Egypt faces” 
(Kassem 2004:133).  
 
With regard to the social appeal of Islamist groups, Mark Tessler and Jolene Jesse examine 
gender differences in the support for Islamist movements in Egypt, Kuwait, and Palestine. 
They note that “support for Islamist organizations does not necessarily come from those 
who hold conservative views about the status of women” (Tessler and Jesse 1996:215). 
Further, Kuwaiti women’s support for Islamist movements stems from an “anti-
establishment Islamist orientation” that is similar to Egyptian men’s support for Islamist 
movements and contrasts with Kuwaiti men’s religious-based support (Tessler and Jesse 
1996:215). This sociological perspective might reinforce the view, as stated by Carapico, that:  
For civilians to generate a civilizing influence does not imply their unanimous a 
priori endorsement of liberal Enlightenment ideals; rather, civic potential lies in the 
very breadth and diversity of models and ideologies alive in the body politic 
(Carapico 1995:243). 
 
Carapico, of course, touches on a widespread debate in the literature on whether Islam and 
democracy are compatible. According to one school of thought,   
Islamist groups cannot become loyal opposition parties because those who are in 
actual control are not individuals who believe in political rules, but are people who 
believe in religious principles that ban the exercise of democracy (Hamzeh 
2000:740).5 
The other school of thought maintains that a distinction should be made between Islamic 
extremists and moderates or pragmatists—the latter being social and political movements 
that will presumably be forced to rethink their ideology when dealing with the practicalities 
of politics like competing for votes (Hamzeh 2000:740-41).6 While there may be elements of 
truth in both schools of thinking, the political context and institutions through which 
Islamists participate in the political process is all important.  
 
Some authors underline the importance of constitutionalism—the establishment of 
sovereignty of the people and the subservience of government and leaders to the 
constitution—in the effort to ensure that opening up the political system does not lead to 
                                                 
 
5 This school includes the writings of Daniel Pipes, Bernard Lewis, Martin Kramer, and Oliver Roy. 
 
6 This school of thought is reflected in the writings of John Esposito, Mumtaz Ahmad, and Lisa Anderson. See 
Esposito (2001) for an overview of debates on the compatibility of Islam and democracy. 
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Islamists use of electoral politics to gain power in order to undermine the system itself 
(Ehtashami 2004; Zakaria 2003; UNDP 2004; Brown 2002). Constitutionalism is seen as 
ensuring accountable government, formed through elections, respect for and adherence to 
principles of human rights, mechanisms to ensure the implementation of the constitution, an 
independent judiciary, and an absence of extra-constitutional government (Ehtashami 
2004:97, 108 n.22; Zakaria 2003:38). Indeed, the Arab Human Development Report 2004 asserts 
that:  
the best insurance against this risk [of the use of electoral politics to undermine 
pluralism] is to strengthen constitutional principles and clauses to safeguard society 
from abuses of majority power, and to secure at the outset the commitment of all 
political movements to respect those measures (UNDP 2004:71). 
 
Ehtashami reminds us that most Muslim states have adopted western-style constitutions and 
secular attitudes towards institutional structures, with Turkey going the furthest, having 
declared itself a secular republic in its constitution (Ehtashami 2004:98). Indeed, the 
constitutional framework governing most Muslim states is “inspired and wedded to 
European constitutional law” (Ehtashami 2004:98). Religious courts preside mostly over 
personal status matters for which Islamic Sharia law is applied. Sharia law is also used as a 
means of underpinning the cultural identity of such states (Ehtashami 2004:98).  
 
On the other hand, As’ad AbuKhalil importantly points out that constitutions in the Arab 
world “are only adhered to insofar as they provide political rationalizations and justifications 
for actions and polities of the government” (AbuKhalil 2002:843). Regimes, he argues, adopt 
constitutions as a façade of accountability. Further, as mentioned above, under states of 
emergency, constitutions are suspended. The state of war with Israel has been used as a 
rationale by Arab regimes to suspend constitutional and parliamentary life in the name of the 
battle for Palestine (AbuKhalil 2002:843). And Nathan Brown acknowledges that judicial 
institutions “operate as only a very weak check (and sometimes as a great facilitator) of 
executive authority” in Egypt at different times and in Kuwait, for example (Brown 
1997:179).   
 
Thus, the debate continues with regard to whether institutions and processes that can ensure 
accountable government in fact produce these results in the Arab world or whether they 
indeed serve to bolster authoritarianism. The tentative steps toward parliamentary 
governments in the Gulf have brought this contradiction to the fore. For example, the 
Kuwaiti parliament is dominated by Islamist groups that are less liberal than the ruling 
monarchs (Herb 2002). Arguably, parliamentary systems serve to moderate Islamist groups 
since their electoral success depends on the protection of a wider set of freedoms (of speech 
and association, for example) (Herb 2002).  
 
As mentioned above, Islamist parties in the region are more successful than their secular 
counterparts. Jenny While’s ethnography of Islamist mobilization in Turkey shows how 
Islamist parties (like Islamic NGOs in the region) are successful because they engage in 
“vernacular politics” which she defines as “value-centered political process rooted in local 
culture, interpersonal relations, and community networks” (White 2002:27). White argues 
that Islamist parties transform politics into something that is integral to local values and 





While Islamist groups seek to participate in political processes, Islamic NGOs, sometimes 
referred to as ‘social Islam’ or Islamic social institutions (ISIs), do not engage in formal 
politics or political lobbying, but are devoted to development issues and cultural awareness 
(Wiktorowicz and Farouki 2003:2). As Quintan Wiktorowicz and Suha Taji Farouki rightly 
point out, the sphere of politics is much broader than the state and parliamentary and party 
politics, and includes symbolic struggles over the rules that guide people’s social lives 
(Wiktorowicz and Farouki 2000:3). It is these struggles that powerfully link Islamic NGOs to 
the wider political sphere and to wider questions of the form and processes of 
democratization. 
 
Islamic NGOs are usually locally organized, though form part of a network of institutions 
and groups that provide a variety of services in the following areas: relief and charity work; 
preschool, primary, and elementary education; education and rehabilitation of physically and 
mentally disabled children and adults; income-generating projects; literacy training; the care 
of orphans and the elderly; youth and sports activities; health care; loans; and even match-
making services. Like other NGOs, Islamic NGOs are restricted by strict legal codes 
governing their work and prohibiting their operation in the political arena.  
 
The charitable work of Islamic NGOs in Jordan is nonetheless inherently political when one 
defines the political beyond institutions, actors and actions that directly engage the state or 
public policy. Islamic NGOs in Jordan use seemingly apolitical networks and social networks 
as vehicles of political participation toward determining the distribution of goods and 
services (Wiktorowicz and Farouki 2000). From their study of the al-Afaf Charitable Society 
in Jordan, Wicktorowitcz and Farouki point out that Islamic NGO programs such as the 
provision of interest-free loans, matchmaking services, and seminars and publications do not 
seem political on the surface, but are part of a broader cultural struggle over values that is 
itself inherently political (Wicktorowitcz and Farouki 2000:10).  
 
Janine Clark’s research on ISIs in Egypt, Yemen and Jordan also provides insight into the 
nature of the social networks in which these institutions are embedded. Her research, she 
asserts, “has important theoretical and empirical significance for understanding the types of 
participants in social movements, how people participate, and the extensiveness of that 
participation” (Clark 2004:942). Clark refutes the general assumption that Islamic 
organizations foster strong ties with the poor through their patron-client networks. In fact, 
she argues, the organizations strengthen and expand middle-class networks. The poor are 
not integrated into the moderate Islamic institutions, which leads Clark to ask the important 
question of whether they are vulnerable to recruitment by other more radical Islamist 
organizations and movements (Clark 2004:966). 
 
But, unlike the adoption of a pro-democracy agenda by Christian churches in Latin America, 
Eastern Europe and South Korea (which were instrumental in civil societies’ ability to push 
for democracy), Islamic organizations in the Arab world have been ambivalent toward 
democracy. There are Islamic NGOs and Islamists that try to demonstrate links between 
Islam and democracy but these groups and individuals lack popular following (Hawthorne 
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2004:12). Some Islamic NGOs emphasize themes of justice, participation, and reform but 
hold negative positions with regard to the rotation of power, and women’s and minority 
rights. Others focus on transforming society through social and spiritual change (Hawthorne 
2004:13). 
 
In Gaza, a shift from ideological to pragmatic approaches is identified on the part of Islamic 
NGOs. Roy states that “there is now a clear pattern of professionalization among Islamic 
NGOs. With the shift in emphasis to the social sector, the Islamic movement appears to be 
moving toward a more pragmatic and non-confrontational philosophy” (Roy 2000:n.p.). 
Although the context of each country is unique, Roy identifies some patterns in Islamic 
NGO organizing that are useful indicators to watch for in other contexts in the region. She 
notes, for example, that Islamic institutions in Gaza do not typically work with non-Islamic 
institutions (though there are exceptions). Further, like secular NGOs, Islamic NGOs are 
very competitive and territorial and have very little interest in collaborating with other 
Islamic or non-Islamic NGOs. Notably, Islamic institutions in Gaza do not work within a 
comprehensive social program or ‘master plan’ at the macro level. This reflects, Roy notes, a 
lack of long-range thinking or planning in terms of program planning. Further, conflict 
between Islamic and non-Islamic institutions reflects competition for limited economic 
resources, rather than ideological differences in approach (Roy 2000:n.p.). 
 
In Gaza, the goal of Islamic NGOs “is not the creation of an Islamic society so much as the 
building of a society that is more Islamic, a society imbued with Islamic values as a form of 
protection against all forms of aggression, and as the basis for growth and progress” (Roy 
2000:n.p.). The “discourse of empowerment” is particularly significant for contexts such as 
Gaza and Iraq. Ehteshami notes that the particular challenges of transitions processes makes 
“the organized uncertainty of democracy” much less appealing to a weary electorate than the 
certainty that is provided by familiar religious-based messages about the purity of religious 
leadership and divine law (Ehteshami 2004:106). Amitai Etzioni cautions that, “the social 
disorder that prevails in these countries is so severe that many citizens yearn for the forceful 
order that existed during the days of tyranny–misbegotten longings that illustrate the threat 
of social anarchy and the difficulty of attending to it (Etzioni 2004:n.p.). 
 
 
What role for youth? 
 
Considering the demographics of the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf, there is 
surprisingly little analysis of the role of youth in political change in the region. About two-
thirds of the population of the Middle East (and presumably it is similar in North Africa and 
the Gulf) are under the age of 25 (Stratton 2005:22). This segment of the population is more 
educated than it has been at any other time in history. The MENA (Middle East and North 
Africa) region experienced the highest rate of expansion in educational attainment in the 
world between 1980 and 2000 (Stratton 2005:23).  
 
At the same time, there are clear links between levels of conflict in a country, and high levels 
of unemployment among youth. As Stratton points out, when unemployment is high among 
youth, which is the case in most MENA countries, there is the potential for strife. In Iraq, 
unemployment among young Sunnis is as high as 80 percent. This includes many of the 
400,000 former Iraqi soldiers, almost all under 30, who are being overlooked by American 
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contractors who prefer to hire workers from Bangladesh and India (Stratton 2005:22-23). 
Youth have historically played a central role in political movements and transition periods. 
In Gaza in particular, their participation has resulted in high levels of trauma (Roy 1996:251). 
 
Youth represent a segment of society that cuts across all classes and that can, hence, play a 
vital and constructive role in the transition period that Arab states are in. It will be important 
to watch for and support civil society organizations that focus on youth or that are run by 
youth and political parties that are able to incorporate the concerns and participation of 
young people.  
 
 
Threads in the literature: 
 
One ‘thread’ running through much of the literature on civil society is the assertion that 
democratization requires a vibrant civil society, the rule of law, and the protection of human 
rights. Further, vibrant civil societies can exist separate from authoritarian realms of control, 
but in such contexts (for example, in Iran), they do not contribute to democratization. 
Vibrant and responsive civil societies are particularly vital for transitions to democracy in the 
Arab world, Iran and Turkey (a point that is underlined in the UNDP’s Arab Human 
Development Report 2004, p. 63).  
 
Electoral politics are insufficient to ensure governments do not use laws to reinforce their 
authoritarian proclivities. The right to freedom of association is linked to the freedom of 
expression and opinion, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of movement, and also 
freedom from human rights violations. Writers point out that the right to freedom of 
association needs to be developed in terms of its legal specificities to provide better 
protection to nongovernmental organizations, and that Arab regimes need to abide by 
international standards for transparency, self-governance, and human rights norms. 
 
Civil societies in the Arab world have not been able to reverse regimes’ authoritarianism or 
affect the wider balance of power (Hawthorn 2004:10). Arab regimes attempt to discredit or 
co-opt NGOs with increasing sophistication (Hawthorne 2004:10). Many of the several 
thousand registered NGOs in Egypt are actually ‘GO-NGOs’ (government organized 
NGOs) or ‘DO-NGOs’ (donor-organized NGOs) (Carapico 2000). At the same time, 
authors note that the important characteristic of autonomy is not a straightforward aspect to 
measure (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:383). A serious shortcoming of studies on civil 
society is the lack of empirical studies that systematically measure and establish any 
correlation between democracy and civil society (Abootalebi 1998:n.p.).  
 
Along with NGOs, political parties are also vital agents of democratization. Moreover, the 
focus on and large amount of funding provided to NGOs by donors as compared to that 
provided to political parties, may actually undermine democratization processes. Civil society 
organizations favoured by donors (in particular, human rights organizations) do not have 
deep roots in their societies and are vulnerable to increased government restrictions and 
repression. On the other hand, political parties have the potential to mobilize larger 
segments of the population and create programs and support for political alternatives.  
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Islamist parties in the region are more successful than their secular counterparts and, along 
with Islamic NGOs, are able to ‘tap into’ individuals’ daily cultural and spiritual realities 
more so than their secular counterparts. Bridges are needed between secular and Islamist 
parties and movements. A clear gap in the literature involves the role of youth, either in civil 






Linking civil society and democratization to wider and underlying problems: 
 
• Much research on civil societies has focused on NGOs (and on human rights NGOs 
in particular) and on their capacities for change. More research is needed on more 
sporadic activism (including riots) and on sectors of society that are the most 
marginalized (the poor, squatters, etc.). While these groups often do not have the 
capacity to organize and effect social or political change, they have been a link 
between civil society demands and states.  
 
• Empirical studies are needed to more systematically examine the correlation between 
democracy and civil society. Such studies could focus on, for example, the 
distribution of power resources within states (see the framework argued for by 
Abootalebi, 1998) or the particularities of authoritarianism which make it so resistant 
to popular contestation (see Ghalioun 2004, and Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004). 
Additionally, research is needed on the ways in which ‘bottom-up’ processes of civil 






Donors need to continue playing a monitoring role, and strengthen their ability to build 
dialogue and partnerships with both government and nongovernment actors over the long 
term.  
 
• There is a need to support research that examines links between secular and Islamist 
groups. 
 
• Research and programs are needed that address social, economic, and political rifts 
between different segments of the society.  
 
 
Fostering legal protection: 
 
• Research and exchange of expertise on drafting legislation may be helpful. Laws need 
to be developed that, for example, limit restrictions on local organizations’ access to 
foreign funds.  
 
• Visits or training of Arab legislators provided in countries that have active and 
autonomous civil societies may be fruitful to provide them with a more exploratory 





Political parties and political party-systems: 
 
Fostering links between civil society and political structures needs to focus on political 
parties as conduits of popular concerns and demands. The following recommendations 
reflect the need for more research into the particular institutional context in which political 
parties operate in individual countries. These recommendations also reflect the need to work 
within and across several realms—political parties themselves, political institutions, and the 
links between parties and civil society. It is important to investigate, for example, areas of 
political openings within individual countries for such things as legislative advice and training 
to government. Specifically,  
 
• Research would be useful on the kinds of legislative changes needed in individual 
countries to ensure the autonomy and effectiveness of political parties. How can 
legislative support be provided to governments? 
 
• What are the organizational needs of political parties and how can these be addressed 
through regional or international exchanges of training and expertise? 
 
• Links between civil society and political structures, including political parties, need to 
be more closely examined:  
- How well are party politics serving the interests of civil society? 
- What room is there to foster links? 






• More research is needed on the links between Islamist movements and various 
sectors of society in different countries. For example, what are the trends with regard 
to youth participation in Islamic NGOs and movements? What are the patterns of 
participation of the poor? Is there a link between individuals’ participation in Islamist 
NGOs and their participation in wider politics? 
 
• There is useful research on Islamist movements in Lebanon and their involvement in 
municipal politics. This kind of research would be useful in different contexts toward 
understanding and the role of municipal politics in generating wider political 
participation of the population as a whole.  
 
• More research is needed on the specificity of Islamist movements in different 
contexts. For example, what determines whether they constitute a force of order and 
moderation rather than extremisms as is often the perception? Studies such as 
Tessler and Jesse (1996) might be followed up in different contexts to understand 







• Research is needed on civil society organizations that focus on youth.  
 
• Research is also needed with regard to the attempts of political parties to incorporate 
the concerns and participation of young people in the region.  
 
• Research and analysis on youth-run organizations or programs and on sectors where 
they can be fostered is particularly important, given the participatory benefits that 
these organizations create. The benefits of youth-run programs for psychologically 
traumatized youths would be useful to examine (particularly with regard to youth in 
Gaza).  
 
• There is also a need for research into whether urban and rural poor youth are being 
recruited into more radical Islamist groups (given that Islamic NGOs and societies 
enhance networks of the middle class and are not as strong as previously perceived 






Middle East regional and international organizations working on issues of 











 Lead by Abdul-Hadi al-Khawajah, a prominent Shia representative who returned from 
exile in 2001; barred, along with the GOYS, Al-Uruba Club administrators and other 
intellectuals, from public gatherings after challenging Manama to accept dialogue 
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 Director: Nader Fergany; an independent, non-commercial institution devoted to 
advancing knowledge on contemporary Egypt, and Arab countries, through research in 
the social sciences, with emphasis on human development. Fields of research emphasis 
include: knowledge acquisition (education/learning and research/development), 























Purpose: Strengthen the management skills and capacity of civic institutions and local 
administrations to improve the delivery of essential municipal services such as water, 
health care, public sanitation, and economic governance. Includes training in 
communications, conflict resolution, leadership skills, and political analysis. 
-began work in Iraq in April 2003 under a contract with the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID). RTI implements USAID’s Local Governance Project (LGP), 
which aims to improve the quality of governance and public services in towns, cities, and 
regions and to help Iraqi citizens make concrete improvements in the neighborhoods 









Since the summer of 2003, partnered with other non-governmental organizations to improve civic and 
political rights of ordinary Iraqis. Activities include political party training seminars, youth-oriented 











Headed by Ghassan Atiyyah, Iraqi dissident and publisher of the oppositionist periodical 
The Iraqi File. IFDD is a regionally based NGO supporting democracy and development 
in Iraq by fostering dialogue between decision-makers and citizens on social, economic, 
and political issues. A primary goal is to bring together people of diverse ethnic, religious, 
political and tribal backgrounds to build consensus on finding solutions to the issues most 
important to the Iraqi people and for assisting in the promotion of freedom and 
democracy. Has convened several conferences, featuring:  
-Brad Smith, Chief of Staff to Congressman David Drier, on the operational concepts and 
procedures of national caucus systems. Participants included academics, journalists, 
attorneys, and politicians. 
-Larry Diamond of the Hoover Institute, addressing the TAL in relation to civil and 
political movements. 
 
Also convened the Supreme Council of Iraqi Tribes, 500 of the most influential sheikhs in 
Iraq. They report that: “These leaders, whose tribes cross ethnic and sectarian lines, agreed 
unanimously to uphold the concepts of democracy and national unity and offered their 
support to the technocrat-staffed Transitional Government. Dr. Atiyyah is currently in 
consultations with the Emir of Bahrain regarding the funding and organization of an Iraqi 
National Reconciliation Conference which would provide a larger forum for debate, 




  Engaged with Iraqi democrats since 1999; established an in-country presence in June 2003 
-programs in Iraq focus on civil society development, political party strengthening, 
assistance with the formation of a democratic legislature and executive branch of 
government, supporting women's political participation and helping ensure an open and 
fair electoral process. 
 
Civil society work: 
-assists civil society groups in developing basic organizational structures and strategic plans 
for becoming actively involved in the political process including monitoring elections and 
the drafting of the constitution.  
-helps partner organizations develop a collective voice so that they can play an 
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intermediary role between citizens and public officials.  
-NDI's political party program has goal of building coalitions and strengthening political 
parties that represent a democratic middle. Since January 2004, has provided training to 
more than 90 parties from around the country on issues including party organization, 
leadership, voter outreach, communication, fundraising and budgeting. Other political 
party training includes campaign academies and workshops providing hands-on training 
specifically on message development and dissemination.  
-governance program aims to strengthen legislative and executive branches; support 
constitutional development. Organizing training on parliamentary procedures and 
legislative drafting; make available international comparative resources in support of the 
constitutional process.  
-program to strengthen women's political participation in Iraq is designed to foster an 
environment in which women are viewed as credible and effective leaders; works with 
political parties and civil society organizations in developing concrete, organic strategies 
for including women in political structures; continues to build a network for women 
political activists that provides a forum for assistance across party lines and gives women 
the skills to present themselves as professional and competitive candidates.  















Human rights training-- 
Civic education project: TV, radio and newspaper ads on the democratic process in Iraq; a 
campaign to support “bigger concepts such as the return of sovereignty, reconstruction, 
support for the army and police, minority rights and public probity”; support to the Iraqi 









 Established in July 2003; providing direct aid, rights awareness, leadership education, 
vocational skills to 600 women in Baghdad, Hillah and Karbala. 
-facilitating a Coordinating Council for local women’s NGOs; holding training workshops 
on forming and running an NGO; planning to develop women’s centres throughout 
country to provide leadership workshops and vocational skills training; Trasitional 
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Protective Services program being developed to assist women who were raped, tortured 














Received $10 million from Congress for programs to prevent sectarian violence, promote the rule of law, 
train and educate a new generation of Iraqi leaders, and prepare American civilians for assignment in Iraq.  
-organized training for Iraqi diplomats, military, and police officials at the National Defense University that 
focused on negotiation, consensus, and team-building skills. Over two years, plans to train 750 senior Iraqi 
officials. Also organizing training workshops for developing Iraqi leaders at the provincial level, with an 
emphasis on conflict management skills and coalition building with pragmatic, problem-solving workshops 
focused on intergroup issues.  
-providing assistance to CSOs to promote intercommunal and interreligious reconciliation, such as the 
newly formed Iraq Council for Dialogue, Reconciliation, and Peace; training officials and civil society 
leaders in conflict management techniques and strategies; designing educational activities and programs to 
help the transition to democracy and reduce conflict; creation of Iraqi institutions committed to religious 
and ethnic coexistence; and support for projects promoting the rule of law.  
-seeking to support Iraqi women through targeted programs that will provide conflict resolution training 
and support their participation in civil society and the public arena. 
-In partnership with Coventry Cathedral, has contributed to the establishment of an Iraqi Center for 
Dialogue, Reconciliation and Peace. Key religious leaders in Iraq have indicated a willingness to participate 
in it. They have already played a role in some tense mediations in connection with kidnappings. 
-sponsoring seminars for high-ranking Iraqis to help in the design and set-up of an Iraqi Special Tribunal to 
prosecute the perpetrators of atrocities under the former regime, including Saddam Hussein himself. The 
seminars bring together a broad range of international experts with Iraqi lawyers and judges, and focus on 
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the legal and practical aspects of establishing a tribunal. Technical assistance will be provided to Iraqis who 
will work on the tribunal. 
-In cooperation with the U.S. Army’s Center for Peacekeeping and Stability Operations, identify the military 
police structures that will need to be created to integrate coalition military efforts with the growing Iraqi 
security forces. The program will also sponsor a series of discussions on Iraq and its neighbors to anticipate 
and prevent regional conflict.  
-curriculum “builds on the belief that educators are essential participants in disseminating information and 
knowledge of conflict resolution and peace building and that students constitute a necessary network of 









The Community Action Program (CAP) works in rural and urban communities across 
Iraq to promote democracy and prevent and mitigate conflict. Working directly through 
partner NGOs and in consultation with local government representatives, USAID is 
creating representative, participatory community groups to identify critical priorities and 














USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives supports critical activities that build and sustain 
Iraqi confidence in the development of a participatory, stable, and democratic Iraq. The 
Iraq Transition Initiative (ITI) worked closely with the Coalition Provisional Authority 
and after the transfer of sovereignty continues to work closely with the Iraqi Interim 
Government and the U.S. Embassy in Iraq. ITI identifies and fills crucial gaps in the U.S. 
Government’s assistance efforts at national and local levels and increases public support 
for the Interim Government. Activities are primarily implemented through a contract with 
Development Alternatives Inc. that allows for fast and flexible disbursement of small 
grants to local Iraqi groups and institutions.  
Since April 2003, ITI has issued more than 1460 small grants totaling over $109 million. 
Initially, ITI’s fast paced assistance met critical needs—providing short-term employment, 
restoring basic government and community services, increasing Iraqi access to information 
and communication, and encouraging protection of human rights. As the situation in Iraq 
evolves, ITI focuses on areas crucial to the development of Iraqi democracy e.g. civic 
education, civil society, media, women’s participation, good governance, conflict 
mitigation, human rights and transitional justice.  
Program Activities: 
Civil Society: funds activities that support civil society development, civic education, and 
media outreach to expand citizen understanding of and participation in the establishment 
of Iraqi institutions. Groups targeted for ITI assistance include women’s and youth 
groups, professional associations, and human rights organizations. At the national level, 
ITI collaborates with the U.S. and Iraqi governments on public information efforts related 
to the constitutional and electoral processes. At the local level, ITI supports programming 
that enhances citizen participation and engages communities and emerging Iraqi leaders in 
addressing local needs.  
Good Governance/Transparency: ITI is working to expand the capacity of the new 
Iraqi government at all levels by enhancing official skills, improving communications 
between political officials and constituents, developing positive links between local 
officials and national authorities, and increasing accountability for government decisions 
and processes. Initially, grant activities focused on ensuring that government entities had 
the proper facilities, equipment and supplies to carry out their functions and provide 
essential services to citizens. Currently ITI supports activities that help the Iraqi people 
learn about their rights and responsibilities in a democracy. By participating in ITI 
sponsored workshops, conferences, opinion polls, and town meetings, Iraqis have an 







IHL in Iraq 
IHL Research Initiative portal offers access to academic and policy-oriented research 










No longer in 
operation 
Established in 1954 as a representative for local and Arab women’s concerns, 
disseminating to a wide sector of the community.  Outlawed in 1956 due to political 







 Formed in 1993 to promote marriage and family formation as a means of encouraging 
reproduction and promote Islamic values, and fending off Western influences which are 
seen as a cause of Arab social ills. Activities include matching services, group weddings, 
interest free loans for marriage, and seminars and workshops relating to Islam and 










 Convened meeting on prison health and human rights (Oct.20, 2000).  The conference was 
cancelled as the government objected and insisted on taping proceedings.   







TÜSIAD Gülap (2001) 
Önis (1997) 
 Turkish Industrialist and Businessmen’s Association 
Founded in the 1970’s by businessmen with political influence 
Members primarily located in Instanbul and surrounding Marmara region. 
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Western political base – supports trade unions with Europe 








Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen  
Voluntary organization founded in 1990 to unite small and medium-scale businesses 
Islamic political base – supports trade unions with other Islamic countries – also an 
important supporter of the Welfare Party 
President: Erol Yarar 











 Intellectuals Club – extreme right organization 
Türk Teşkilati Çinar & 
Arikan 











 Islam extremist organization founded after the Iranian revolution in 1979, initially used by 
the state to help suppress Kurdish activists, but gained independence from the state in the 
1990’s and became a “jihādist terror group”. 
Amnesty 
International 
White (1999) Investigation 
of Anti-Terror 
Law, 1991 
Noted that sections of the Law that had previously been used to persecute Kurds for 
separatism had been repealed, but that the new articles (Article 8) still allow lengthy 
imprisonment and fines for non-violent forms of political dissent. 
Also reported in 1995 on killings of hundreds of prisoners and civilians by the PKK 
Mazlum Der White (1999)  Conservative human rights organization, led by Ensaroğlu – argues that Turkish 
Constitutions are increasingly curbing human rights.   
Ĭnan Haklari 
Derneği (IHD) 
White (1999)  “Slightly left wing” Human Rights Association – led by Birdal 
Finds that the Constitution holds the state sacred above all else – including human rights. 
Human Rights 
Watch/Helsinki 
White (1999)  Human rights monitoring organization – also expresses concern with the use of torture, 






White (1999)  British human rights monitoring organization – that reported in 1995 that although the 
Geneva convention was being ignored by the PKK’s guerrilla actions, the situation was not 
as bad as portrayed by other organizations due to the selectivity of targets and suspect 
















and of public 
assembly in 
Turkey 
Published a report entitled, “The Rights to Freedom of Association and of Expression in 
Turkey – A new Legal Framework” by Ali Turgan (lawyer), Drs. Ulku Azrak and Rona 
Serozan, and Oguz Esmer, activist of Cure-Is-You Movement (CareSiz Hareketi). Activities 




APPENDIX B: Regional Overview of Political and Governmental Mechanisms 
 
PERSIAN GULF COUNTRIES 
 
 Elections/suffrage Political parties Government/constitution/judiciary Notes 
Kuwait Free elections; no 
suffrage for women 
(in 1999 parliament 
rejected the emir’s 
proposal to allow 
women to vote) or 
bedouin 
Parties operate 
informally but are weak; 
electoral system 
produces parliament of 
independents, some 
aligned with ruling 
family, others with 
liberal or Islamist 
groups. 
Monarchy, with ruling family holding 
‘ministries of sovereignty’ and 
enjoying wide support; 1962 
constitution calls for a parliament 
but gives ruling family balance of 
power; Islamists are the single largest 
political tendency in government 
(they are united with liberals in 
wanting a parliament but have no 
other common ground). 
Considered the freest of the Gulf states, 
with the most transparent gov’t., though 
2003 elections ‘toppled’ Kuwaiti liberals. 
 
A different electoral system could produce 
stronger political parties, though deep rifts 
between Islamists and liberals, Sunnis and 
Shi’ites, tribes and city are likely to persist 
(Herb 2002:45). 
Bahrain Only country in 
Gulf where women 
can vote in national 
elections 
Political parties are 
banned 
Constitution adopted in 1973, 
modeled on Kuwait’s; provides for 
separation of powers but amir alone 
can appoint and remove PM and 
cabinet members; was revised in 
2002 to further limit powers of 
parliament. Parliament is dominated 
by Islamists but deliberations focus 
on social issues rather than political. 
Potential for democratization but as with 
other Gulf countries, progress is seen to be 
“painfully slow” (Kéchichian 2004:53). 
Qatar Popular suffrage for 
municipal elections; 
women ran in local 
elections in 1999 
though none won. 
Political parties are 
banned 
2003 elections approved a new 
Constitution but it awaits Amir’s 
approval. It calls for 30 elected and 
15 appointed representatives; 
elections planned for 2005. 
Movement toward liberalization are 
tactical on the part of the emir, expecting a 
parliament will firm up his rule. 
Yemen 2003 held third 
parliamentary 
3 main parties and 20 
smaller parties 
Constitution adopted in 1991, 
affirms freedom of association and 
Absence of checks and balances on 
executive powers; much government 
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elections - ruling party: General 
People’s Congress 
(GPC); Yemeni Socialist 
Party (YSP); and Islah 
main opposition 
(Islamist) 
equality regardless of sex, colour, 
racial origin, language, occupation, 
social status or religion; 
Judiciary is only nominally 
independent and  
corruption. 
Oman Right to vote 
extended to all 
adults but in 
practice only 3% of 
population has 
suffrage 
Political parties are 
banned 
Basic Law includes a Bill of Rights 
that guarantees freedom of the press, 
religious tolerance, equality of race 
and gender, and an independent 
judiciary 
Pace of reform very slow, and changes so 
far may have resulted primarily from the 
1994 coup d’état that shook the regime 
(Kéchichian 2004:44). 
UAE The UAE and Saudi 
Arabia remain the 
only two countries 
in the world that do 
not grant any voting 
rights. 
Political parties are 
prohibited by the 
constitution. 
Historically, Dubai alone 
has a history of active 
political parties.  
Provisional constitution of 1971 
provides for a 40-member majles that 
the president can override. Members 
are appointed by the rulers of the 
seven principalities. 
 







Political parties are 
banned 
Basic Law of Government 
promulgated in 1992 
Some orchestrated public dialogue on 
issues of reform 
 
 
MIDDLE EAST and TURKEY 
 
 Elections (unlike in 
the Gulf, there is 
Political parties Government/constitution/judiciary Notes 
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universal suffrage) 
Palestine Two previous 
presidential 
elections declared 
free and fair. 
Varied parties and movements.   PLO, PA, PLC  
Lebanon Opposition 
expecting to win a 
majority in the 
pending elections. 
Parties are overwhelmingly 
sectarian based.  
Government plunged into crisis 
after the assassination of Prime 
Minister Hariri.  
 
Jordan 1993 first multiparty 
parliamentary 
election since 1956. 
Parties banned in 1957; martial 
law repealed in 1989 and parties 
allowed to function. Some 90 
registered parties.  
80 seat parliament;  Tribalism and regional 
identification presides over 
ideological or political/party 
affiliation. Despite protests by 
activists to the contrary, the 1993 
elections are seen as heralding the 
consolidation of democracy in 
Jordan. 
Syria General elections to 
the People’s 
Assembly held every 
4 years since 1973 
Ba’ath Party has dominated the 
Assembly; the National 
Progressive Front (formed by 
the Ba’ath regime and whose 
policy is determined by the 
Ba’ath Party according to the 
1973 constitution) holds most 
of remaining seats in Assembly. 
In 1990, the Front accepted a 
regime-sponsored Islamic party 
into its fold to increase its 
legitimacy. 
Martial law is in effect. 1973 
constitution gives president wide 
powers; also gives the People’s 
Assemby powers to veto or amend 
presidential decrees though this 
power has remained dormant.  
Democratization is seen as 
unlikely. 
Iran Minimum age of 
suffrage is 15 
Political parties, though 
numerous, have been 
A theocratic republic with 
compromised independence of the 
A politics of despair and growing 
popular sentiment that normal 
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“ephemeral, fragile” structures, 
though some, including regional 
parties (representing Kurds and 
Azerbaijanis) have represented 
constituent interests; pressure 
groups are more influential 
(Tachau 1994:140-41).  
judicial system. Conservative 
Islamists dominate the unicameral 
Islamic Consultative Assembly (or 
majles). 
political processes are not effective 
or responsive to participation 
(Kazemi 2003:92). 
Iraq Elections in  Country in transition from one-
party military dictatorship. 
Numerous parties, reflecting 
ideological as well as ethnic and 
regional distinctions 
Liberal, democratic framework still 
not in place; Constitution drafted; 
Islam as source of legislation is a 
point of contention with clerics; 
constitution: see country profile 
Seen as a test case of the 
‘reformability’ of Muslim polities 
through external pressure. 
Turkey  1967 Party Law regulates 
structure and features of parties 
(Marxism and advocacy of 
Shari’a law illegal). Under 
military rule all political parties 
banned in 1980; elections since 
1987 several parties ran in 
parliamentary elections. 
1982 constitutions established a 400 
seat one-house parliament (later 450 
seats).  
Restrictive electoral laws curb party 





 Elections Political parties Government/Constitution/judiciar
y 
Notes 
Tunisia Free multiparty 
parliamentary 
elections in 1989.  
Single party system from the 
1950s; protests and repression 
in the 1970s were followed by 
political liberalization in the 
1980s, with some political 
 ‘Electoral democracy’ without 
democratization. Liberalization 
controlled from above as a means 
of gaining legitimacy. 
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parties legalized. Islamic 
Tendency Movement (MTI) 
took up social protests in 1980s 
and established itself as the 
most important opposition 
organization (though did not 
win seats in elections) in 1989. 
The ruling party, Democratic 
Constitutional Rally (RCD), 
remains the dominant political 
party.  
Morocco 1993 elections 
resulted in 
significant gains for 
two main 
opposition parties, 
but the king’s 
limited offer of 
participation led to 
the parties’ boycott 
of the government 
and a government 
of technocrats with 
no party affiliation.  
The activity, relative freedom 
and number of political parties 
is much greater than any other 
country in the region. Trend 
has been: increasing diversity 
but decreasing importance. 
Parties proliferated in 1970s 
Uninterrupted parliament since 
1977, though legislative power of 
parliament weak and electoral 
legislation favours parties loyal to 
the King. 
One of the world’s oldest royal 
dynasties, with the greatest number 
of people (24 million) living under 
monarchic rein and rule. The 
manipulation of politics by the 
king is seen as a major impediment 
to democratization. 
Algeria Flawed electoral 
process. 2004 
elections won by 
Bouteflika as all 
other candidates 
withdrew the night 
before election. 
Widespread riots and protests 
in 1988 were brutally 
suppressed but led to 
protection of freedom of 
association and assembly 
(Article 39), and the right to 
create political associations 
Multipartyism consecrated in article 
40 of 1989 constitutions but the 
Algerian presidency, which initiated 
the reforms, “had no intention of 
ceding power and did not initiate 
any serious negotiations with the 
new parties” (Tachau 1994:20). 
There has been a decline in 
political violence in the last five 
years, with disappearances stopped. 
Amendments to penal code 
improve human rights but they still 
fall short of international 
standards. 
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(Article 40), which allowed for 
a muilti-party system and the  
theoretical ending the FLN’s 
monopoly (Salhi 2002:32).  
Parties based exclusively on 
religious, linguistic, or regional 
issues not allowed, but Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS) was not 
banned (Salhi 2003:32). List of 
parties below. 
About 25 parties are registered but 
these have no social base 
whatsoever (Tachau 1994:21).  
Libya  Several parties formed in the 
1940s after liberation; all were 
banned in 1952, though some 
worked underground until the 
1969 revolution which brought 
the military to power. Only the 
ruling party was permitted and 
then that was abolished. The 









16 legal parties and the Muslim 
Brotherhood (which is illegal 
but tolerated as an opposition 
movement). It remains difficult 
for parties to function outside 
their own offices and they are 
excluded from policy making. 
Parties have little grassroots 
following, and elicit little 
popular enthusiasm (Tachau 
1994:102). 
Presidency has ‘enormous’ powers, 
in party through emergency law 








Postindependence Algeria is credited with being the most ‘successful’ example of the 
bureaucratic-authoritarian state. As mentioned in the introduction, a dynamic civil society 
coexisted in the 1970s and 1980s with closed political institutions (Entelis 1996:46). Both 
pre-revolutionary and postrevolutionary factors can account for that. Algeria won its 
independence in 1962 after 130 years as a French colony and département d’outremer (DOM) 
and after having drawn much from French notions of associational life and state-society 
relations (Entelis 1996:55).  
 
The following discussion outlines recent political history, associational life, and women’s 
activism in Algeria. Algeria’s liberation war cost the country 1 million lives (Korany and 
Amrani 1998:11). The National Liberation Front (FLN) ruled as a one-party regime for more 
than a quarter-century. President Chadli Benjedid introduced a new constitution in 1989 that 
allowed independent political parties. Multiparty elections were held in January 1992, but an 
army-backed coup occurred once it was clear that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) would 
win a majority in parliament (Human Rights Watch 2005). The FIS was then banned and its 
leaders arrested. 
 
These events set off a bloody civil war that has resulted in between 100,000 to 200,000 
deaths. Both radical Islamists and government-backed militias are accused of committing 
mass killings. And human rights groups have accused Algerian security forces of causing the 
"disappearance" of about 7000 Algerians between 1993 and 1997 (Human Rights Watch 
2005).  
 
There has been a decline in political violence in the last five years. The disappearances have 
reportedly stopped, and there are fewer security-related arrests and instances of torture being 
reported. But, assessments are hampered by the inability of international human rights 
organizations to gain access to Algeria (Human Rights Watch 2005). In October 2004, the 
Algerian parliament amended the penal code, which now criminalizes acts of torture. Human 
Rights Watch notes, though, that the amendment falls quite short of international standards 
(Human Rights Watch 2005).  
 
The electoral process in Algeria is flawed. On the eve of the 1999 presidential election, all 
other candidates except Abdelaziz Bouteflika withdrew from the race, alleging fraud. 
Similarly, the 2004 presidential election was easily won by Bouteflika when all the other 
candidates withdrew the night before the election (Brown 2004) 
 
Freedom of association 
 
During Algeria’s 25 years of one-party rule, civil society “was not allowed, for all intents and 
purposes, to exist” (Korany and Amrani 1998:27). Korany and Amrani note that associations 
did exist but they lacked autonomy and could not contest state policy or party views (Korany 
and Amrani 1998:27; see also Moussa and Beaudet 1995). John Entelis provides some 
context for this situation. Following Algeria’s hard-won revolution, a “bargain” was struck 
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between the population and the leadership by which “the populace gave up its rights to 





The Algerian Family Code, which became law in 1984, proclaims women to be minors under 
the law, and defines them as daughters, mothers, or wives. Algerian women are demanding 
its repeal and challenging patriarchal values and Islamic fundamentalism.  
 
Agerian women’s active participation in the war of liberation, although widely lauded, was 
not sufficient to counter the denial of their basic civil rights. The 1976 constitution 
underlined women’s political rights and the need for women to fight for their social rights 
through their deportment and struggle. In 1978, Chadli Bendjedid, head of the Islamo-
ba’thist clan, came to power, won over the socialist modernists, and set about placing the 
country under sharia law. This entailed launching attacks against women, education, and the 
justice system (Salhi 2003:29).  In 1980, a ministerial order prevented women from traveling 
unless accompanied by a male relative, thus breaking women’s constitutional right to 
freedom of movement. After women’s protests, it was repealed. But by 1981, a rollback of 
women’s rights was effected in a new Family Code. Wide protests were not able to prevent it 
from passing into law in 1984.  
 
The Family Code of 1984, based on the teachings of Shari’a law as well as a tradition of 
patriarchy and misogyny in Algeria, made all women minors in education, work, marriage, 
divorce, and inheritance, and legalized polynamy for men (Turshen 2002:6). Women are 
legally obliged to breastfeed their children and care for them until adulthood, though do not 
have the right to pass on their name, nationality, or religion to them (Salhi 2003:30). Women 
may obtain divorce only by giving up any claim to alimony. Men are not obliged to support 
their children after divorce, and since 1980, there are increasing numbers of destitute women 
and children.   
 
On 5 October 1988, thousands of youths joined “bread riots” and protested in the streets of 
Algeirs against the structural adjustment program imposed by the World Bank and IMF 
(Turshen 2002:7). Protesters also demanded an end to corruption and oppression, including 
violence, torture, and arbitrary arrests by the state. The Algerian League for Human Rights 
and doctors formed the National Committee Against Torture. Other groups and 
organizations expressed their full support of the youth movement and called for the 
recognition of democratic liberties. (Salhi 2003:32). Islamists were silent on the issue of 
torture but demonstrated en mass. While the protests were brutally suppressed they did lead 
to gains, including a free press, the right to organize civil society, the creation of new 
political parties, and eventually the departure of President Chadli (Turshen 2002:8). Freedom 
of expression, association, and assembly (Article 39), and the right to create political 
associations, meaning political parties (Article 40), allowed for a muilti-party system and 
theoretically ending the FLN’s monopoly (Salhi 2002:32).  
 
A subsequent law on political associations was issued which prohibits the formation of 
parties based exclusively on religious, linguistic, or regional issues. Nonetheless, several 
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parties that should have been banned under this provision were recognized by the 
government, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) (Salhi 2003:32).  
 
Women’s organizations are legally recognized. Nonetheless, activists are harassed, 
particularly since 1992, when Islamic fundamentalists began a violent terrorist campaign in 
an attempt to enforce strict observance of Shari’a law with regard to how it affects women 
(Salhi 2003:33). Salhi notes that, “Harassment has been relentless and unbeArable, 
particularly for women who live alone or who refuse to wear the veil in the workplace” 
(Salhi 2003:33).  
 
The discourse of the FIS regarding women is not very different from that of the FLN, with 
both ignoring the socio-economic changes, including the economic crisis of the 1980s that 
affected women as much as men (Salhi 2003:33). Aspects of the FIS platform included 
discouraging women from working outside the home. A 1994 FIS fatwa legalized the killing 
of girls and women not wearing the hijab (a scarf that hides the hair and neck and, in Algeria, 




In 1987 a law was passed authorizing the creation of NGOs, which greatly invigorated 
women’s activism (Turshen 2002:7). There are now several dozen active new Algerian 
NGOs, including SOS femme en détress (SOS Women in Distress), which was founded in 
1991 to help support women in psychological, medical, or legal difficulties. RACHDA 
(Collective against Denigration and for the Rights of Algerian Women) was founded in 1996. 
Women parliamentarians created a caucus to push for legislative reforms. Among other 
issues, women are calling for the government to recognize women raped by terrorists (2,029 
women are believed to have survived rape by terrorists) as legal victims of terrorism, which 




As of 2002, the SOS was carrying out a multidisciplinary project on violence and social 
change to survey suffering, institutional violence, family violence, and women’s changed 
identity following the death of a husband and loss of status (Turshen 2002:18).  
 
While the terrorist violence mounted in the 1990s, so did the Algerian women’s movement. 
Women in demonstrations in the streets, female political leaders in Parliament and political 
groups, and women writers condemn and unmask the misogyny of the fundamentalists. 
They note that 80 percent of the 100,000 Algerian victims massacred during the 1990s were 
women and children, and call for the end to Algerian society’s silence over the crime of 
systematic rape (Salhi 2003:34).  
 
The most preoccupying women’s issue in Algeria is the Family Code (Turshen 2002:15). The 
1984 Family Code, argues Turshen, exposed secret negotiations between political and 
religious leaders, and the government’s willingness to sacrifice women’s rights in order to 
stay in power—a pattern that continued into the 1990s (Turshen 2002:16). Abdul Aziz 
Bouteflika’s election as President at the end of the 1990s was massively supported by women 
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voters. Thus far, the president has made major compromises with Islamist terrorist groups, 
and has made no changes to the Family Code (Salhi 2003:33-34).  
 
Women hold 5 of the 380 seats in the Algerian National Assembly (APN), and in 1999 held 
2 of 40 ministerial posts (Turshen 2002:17). Turshen suggests both that amendments to the 
Family Code is just a matter of time and that the economy, currently undergoing rapid 
liberalization, will largely determine the fate of women and men (Turshen 2002:17).  
 
Algerian political parties 
 
Party Principles and appeal 
Islamic 
Salvation Front 
Lead by ‘Ali Benhadj. Draws on the teachings of medieval Syrian Sunni 
scholar Ibn Taymiyya, reworked in the 20th century by Egyptian Sayyid 
Qtub. Calls for stricter measures with regard to women toward total 
population control as a necessary step to seizing control of the state. 
 
Reformulated and reinvented memories of the war for independence; 
gives a positive new identity (by differentiating itself from the West). 
 
External support: part of a pan-Islamic movement; received training 
from Al Qaeda and financial support from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. 
The violent Islamist practices appear to have been imported from 
Afghanistan (Turshen 2002:18). 
Workers Party Led by Louisa Hanoune, the only woman to lead a political party. A 
relatively small party, it is one of the few groups in Parliament seen as a 
genuine opposition party. Hanoune is also seen as one of the few voices 
for reconciliation with the vanquished Islamists and for recognition of 





Nationalist Party, led by A. Bouteflika. Won the 2004 elections with 47.8 
% of registered voters (Parks 2005:100). 
 





Nationalist, A. Benflis 
Al-Islah Islamist, A Djaballah 
Rassemblement 
pour la Culture 
et la Democratie 
(RCD) 
Berber-Rights, S. Sadi 





BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, and QATAR 
 
Nathan Brown notes that the regimes of the Gulf have been “unabashedly autocratic”:  
with the exception of short periods in Bahrain and much longer periods in Kuwait, 
liberal democratic institutions and practices have generally not even existed on a 
nominal level (Brown 1997:129).  
 
There have, though, been some movements toward electoral and parliamentary politics.  
Gulf countries that have had parliamentary elections include Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and 
Oman. Only in Bahrain has there been parliamentary elections with universal suffrage 
(though with the exception of the Bedouin who remain stateless). In Kuwait, only men vote 
in parliamentary elections and the electorate makes up only 17 percent of the population 
(Valenti 2003:1). In Qatar, there have only been municipal elections, with men and women 
voting in these. In Oman, parliamentary elections have been held with eligible male and 
female voters making up only 3 percent of the population (Valenti 2003:1).   
 
Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar are the gulf states Full parliamentary democracy in Kuwait, 
Qatar and Bahrain will not be attained in the near future (Herb 2002:47). In fact, the Gulf 
region generally presents a situation in which the democratization of governments, in the 
form of popular elections, has produced illiberal policies. This disconnect between 
democratization and liberalization stems from the fact that the ruling families are generally 
more liberal than Islamists who stand to gain in electoral politics (Herb 2002:42).  
 
In terms of the parliamentary processes underway in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, Herb 
concludes that the partial democratization will not lead to Islamist takeovers (Herb 2002; 
Carapico 1995) Rather, parliamentary elections in the Gulf indicate that Islamists have a 
stake in defending the rights of association and the liberal freedoms of parliamentary life 
(Herb 2002:47). Parliamentary life, notes Herb, “does seem to promote some degree of 
moderation among Islamists” (Herb 2002:42). Further, the ruling families in the Gulf are 
very deeply ensconced, leaving little possibility that Islamists would be a threat to their rule 
and—importantly—little possibility that parliamentary reform will translate into real 





Bahrain provides a useful picture of this dynamic and is, additionally, seen as a bellwether for 
the political climate of the Gulf because of its long history of popular opposition and 
demands for political and economic reforms. Further, its civil society is the most complex 
and advanced of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (which includes Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, and Bahrain) (Bahry 2000:129) 
 
Bahrain’s first legislative elections since 1973 were held in October 2002. Political parties are 
banned in Bahrain, so opposition candidates ran as independents. Secular candidates secured 
21 of the 40 seats. Half of the registered voters were women, and the overall turnout was 53 
percent (Election Watch 2002). Bahrain is the only country in the Persian Gulf where 
women have been able to vote in national elections. Moreover, eight of the 170 candidates 
were women (Sengupta 2002a:7). Two women candidates made it to the second count. The 
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largest of the country’s Shiite groups (and three other Shiite groups) sat out the elections, 
calling the new Parliament a sham as it does not have the power to legislate without consent 
of the other house, which is appointed by the King (Sengupta 2002b:3). The boycott had 
little effect, though, on the Shiite participation (Valenti 2003:1). The following sketch 




There are four main social strata in Bahrain (see Table…) that mark divisions between rich 
and poor and the powerful and powerless. These divisions are more marked in Bahrain than 
elsewhere in the Gulf, partly because of Bahrain’s lack of oil wealth and economic 
opportunities (Peterson 2001:9), but also due to Bahrain’s historical rifts. Unlike Kuwait, 
Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, with Sunni majorities and Sunni ruling families, Bahrain has a 
Shi’ite majority that is presided over by the Sunni Al Khalifah family that took over Bahrain 
in 1783 and has since treated the Shi’ite population as a conquered people (Herb 2002:45).  
 
The economic situation of Bahrain – almost-depleted oil fields, high unemployment 
(estimated at 16-30 percent), difficulty in attracting foreign investment, and a ‘free visa’ 
system which allows influential people to import foreign labour “by the hundreds”—has 
disproportionately impacted the Shi’ite population (Bahry 2000:138). In addition, Shi’ite 
exclusion from power has alienated the Shi’ite population and lead to demands for more 




Although dated, J.E. Peterson’s The Arab Gulf States Steps Toward Political Participation (1988) 
provides a brief overview of Bahraini governing bodies and legislation, including the 
Constitutional Assembly, the functions and principle issues of the brief the National 
Assembly (1973-75), and the majlis.  
 
Briefly, the constitution provides for separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, 
with legislative power held jointly by the amir and the National Assembly. The constitution 
itself was written in consultation with Kuwait’s constitutional expert. Like Kuwait, Bahrain is 
not a true parliamentary state, as the amir alone can appoint and remove the prime minister 
and other members of the cabinet. Additionally, only the amir can initiate, ratify and 
promulgate laws (Peterson 1988:72-73). Thus, while the constitution states that sovereignty 
resides in the people, as “the source of all powers,” the same article designates the state as a 
hereditary monarchy (Peterson 1988:77). Succession falls to the king’s eldest son. As noted 




While unrest has been recurring in the last century in Bahrain, with sustained and organized 
dissidence, the last such period between 1994 and 1999 was marked by greater Shi’ite 
organization and domination of the opposition movement. Young, Iran-trained rural 
religious leaders led this last wave of opposition, making it both more populist and more 
Shi’ite in make-up and inspiration than previous dissent.  
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Since the success of the Iranian revolution in 1979, religious symbols were employed as 
political tools in opposition politics in Bahrain (Bahry 2002:131). Bahraini clerics, trained in 
Iran, began to use sermons and religion to mobilize the public.7 Meanwhile, the aftermath of 
the first Gulf War spawned calls for political liberalization in Bahrain, by those who saw an 
opportunity to follow those in Kuwait demanding political reforms such as elections and the 
reestablishment of the parliament (disbanded there in 1986) (Routine 1997:23). For their part, 
the Al Khalifas were amenable to improving the legitimacy of the ruling family in Bahrain.  
 
The goals of the opposition (increased economic opportunities, an end to discrimination, 
constitutional reform, including restoration of the National Assembly which had been 
suspended in 1975) were shared by much of the population. Nonetheless, the movement 
was exhausted by 1999, mostly by government repression (Peterson 2001:10). In 1999, 
Shaikh Hamad bin Isa acceded to the throne, pardoned dissidents, and pledged to address 
political concerns and adopt a modern charter (Kéchichian 2004:40).  
 
In 2001, Shaikh Hamad freed almost 300 political prisoners, and held a referendum which 
resulted in 98% support for a National Charter with provisions for the independence of the 
judiciary, a bicameral legislative body by 2004 (Peterson 2002:10). Shaikh Hamad also 
decreed the repeal of the State Security Law of 1974, which allowed arbitrary and 
incommunicado detention and unfair trials.8 A 40-member parliament and a 40-member 
appointed consultative council (majlis al-shura) was created; the parliament was elected with 
Islamist groups (both Sunni and Shia) dominating it, and Shaikh Hamad appointed five 
women, a Christian and a Jew to the Shura Council. These changes raised hopes as did the 
abolishment of the State Security Court, the departure of the British head of security, and an 
amnesty for all exiles (Peterson 2001:10).  
 
Notably, though, parliamentary deliberations have focused on social issues rather than 
political affairs Kéchichian 2004:40). Moreover, the changes that were made to Bahrain’s 
1973 constitution actually limited the powers of parliament. The elected deputies have less 
power than they had under the 1973 Constitution. The consultative council is an advisory 
body with no legislative powers (Bahry 2000:133).  
 
The attitude of the ruling family, then, remains paramount in terms of further reforms. As 
Herb noted in 2002,  
It is primarily the attitude of the ruling family that will determine the fate of the 
current opening; the family will have to make the concessions necessary to keep the 
moderate opposition engaged. Opposition leaders, for their part, will need to balance 
                                                 
 
7 Iran has historically laid claim to Bahrain as part of Iranian territory. The Bahrain government has repeatedly 
invoked the threat of Iranian subversion to rationalize its restrictions on civil and political rights in the country 
(“Routine Abuse” 1997:89).  
 
8 This initiative was among those recommended by Human Rights Watch in their 1997 report, "Routine Abuse, 
Routine Denial: Civil Rights and the Political Crisis in Bahrain." Human Rights Watch notes that many 
Bahraini rights defenders expressed the belief that this report and subsequent interventions and letters to U.N. 
and European Union officials, played an important role in support of their calls for political reform and the 
addressing of these systematic abuses by Bahraini authorities (see Human Rights Watch report, Progress in 
Bahrain, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/Bahrain/). 
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their desire to keep the game going with their need to remain responsive to the 
demands of their constituents (Herb 2002:46).  
 
The cabinet has eighteen members, including the prime minister, seven of which are from 
the ruling family. The remaining eleven ministers are divided between Sunni (five) and Shi’ite 
(six), though Shi’ites claim they are given secondary posts such as ministries of labour, 
commerce and health (rather than defense… ) Bahry 2000:133. The Shi’ites, notes Bahry, do 
not have sufficient representation in either of the formal ruling institutions (the cabinet and 
the advisory consultative council); they are also not represented in the Bahrain Defense 
Force (BDF) or the police force, both of which have a high percentage of Sunnis from 
Pakistanis, Syrians, Yemenis, and Jordanians, who are given good salaries, legal residency, 
and housing. (Shi’ites charge serves the underlying goal of changing the demographic 
composition of the country and increasing the numbers of Sunnis in relation to Shi’ites) 
(Bahry 2000:133-34). 
 
Further exclusion is effected by the requirement, for many jobs, of a certificate of ‘good 
behaviour and conduct’ which is only attainable if one has no previous police record or 
arrest for political reasons. Many Shi’ites have been arrested for protests, which continue and 
which perpetuate their exclusion (Bahry 2000:134). The most extreme exclusion is 
experienced by the seven percent, or 20-30,000 of the Shi’ite population who are Bedouin, 
and as such remain stateless, are denied political and social rights (such as passports, legal 
residency, schooling, and medical care) and variously deported to Iran, despite being third-
generation residents of Bahrain. This situation further alienates Bahraini Shi’ites (Bahry 
2000:135).   
 
Human rights and freedom of association: 
 
Human Rights Watch report, Routine Abuse, Routine Denial: Civil Rights and the Political Crisis in 
Bahrain (1997), reports that human rights abuses in Bahrain are wide-ranging. They fall into 
two categories: law enforcement and administration of justice issues, and the denial of 
fundamental political rights and civil liberties. The former include arbitrary detention, 
physical and psychological abuse of detainees, prohibiting access to legal counsel, and the 
denial of the right to a swift and impartial judicial hearing. The second area of human rights 
violations includes the denial of freedom of expression, freedom of association and 
assembly, and the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs (Routine 1997:1). It is 
unclear whether these have improved in the previous eight years.  
 
The Bahraini government’s exile of its citizens accounts for the expatriate location of human 
rights organizations such as the Copenhagen-based Bahrain Organization for Human Rights 
(BHRO), and the Damascus-based Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Bahrain 
(CDHRB). The Bahrain Centre for Human Rights (BCHR), headed by Abdul-Hadi al-
Khawajah, a prominent Shia representative who returned from exile in 2001, along with the 
GOYS, Al-Uruba Club administrators and other intellectuals, has been barred from public 
gatherings after demanding a dialogue with the ruling family (Kéchichian 2004:41). Last 
September, the centre was closed down and its directed arrested after criticizing the 
country’s economic problems and past human rights abuses (Human Rights News 2004).  
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A new labour union law went into effect in 2002, which requires trade unions to be 




About 400 matams, or religious meeting places, serve the Shi’ite community. These are sites 
of religious commemoration and social and political gathering. Along with matams, charity 
funds play an important role in servicing and uniting the Shi’ite community  (Bahry 
2000:135). Two main newspapers toe the government’s line but did offer space to 




Bahrain has been quicker to accept wider social and economic roles for women than its 
neighbours, with many Bahraini women in the workforce, and a women ambassador to 
France (Brooks 2000). Since the early 1950s, women have organized charitable societies. In 
the early 1970s, voluntary women’s societies with political orientations emerged (Saikaly 
1994:419). In terms of women’s legislative rights, it is not clear whether much has changed 
in the last decade when May Saikaly noted that, “women find themselves dependent on 
customs and traditions rather than on laws to protect their rights. The social standing, 
alliances and economic power of the woman’s family protect her rights more effectively than 
the law does” (Saikaly 1994:424). 
 
In trying to push for the promulgation of a personal status law, women lawyers, women’s 
societies and nongovernmental organizations face opposition from religious institutions 
controlled by the quda (?) and from officials and fundamentalist groups (Saikaly 1994:424). 
Saikaly notes that,  
when reviewing cases brought to court, especially those dealing with personal and 
family disputes, judgment is most often passed in favor of the man, and the women 
are the losers. Religious law as translated by the quda reflects its conservative male 
bias and coercive power...There have been known cases when quads decide cases not 
on justice of the merit of the case but by ethnic and denominational biases (Saikaly 
1994:424).  
 




Source General Info 
Al Khalifah 
ruling family 
-Kalifah bin Salman is the Prime Minister and part of one of the largest 
ruling families in the Gulf; enjoys a monopoly of political power at the top, 
supported by tribal allies originally from Saudi Arabia. 
Hawla families Second stratum; the principal economic elite; migrated from Iran but claim 
Saudi origin 
Baharina  Original farming inhabitants; entirely Shi’i; villagers and urban poor, 






Fourth and bottom stratum; although Iran controlled Bahrain prior to the 
18th century, nearly all Persians in Bahrain immigrated this century 
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The infitah (economic open door policy) that was introduced in 1974 and, in 1991, the 
adoption of an economic reform and structural adjustment program (ERSAP) have led some 
to conclude that Egypt is undergoing a successful democratization process (see, for example, 
Korany, Brynen and Nobel 1998). Others (Kassem 2004; see also Goodson and Radwan 
1997), assert that Egypt illustrates a successful authoritarian regime that uses patronage, 
cooptation, exclusionary laws, and coercion to maintain “contained pluralism” and adopt the 
appearance of liberalization and democratization (Kassem 2004:3).  
 
Kassem’s study traces changes in the political regimes through Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak’s 
governments, concluding that the authoritarian style of each was further reinforced, with 
Mubarak’s multiparty system masking increasing centralization of power in the presidency 
(Kassem 2004). Kassem contends that Mubarak’s presidencies have made Egypt of the most 
resilient personal authoritarian systems in the world. One of Kassem’s central arguments is 
that the nature and functioning of Egypt’s civil society is shaped by the political system in 
which it operates more so than by the sociocultural environment in which it exists (Kassem 
2004:9). Similarly, she argues that the increasing exclusion of Islamist parties and the brutal 
tactics employed by the Egyptian state has led to the rise of political Islam and, in particular, 
its extremist form (Kassem 2004:9). 
 
Similarly, Goodson and Radwan (1997) argue that despite recent economic and political 
liberalization, the Egyptian polity is dominated by the “enormous constitutional and legal 
authority” of the presidency (Goodson and Radwan 1997:3). Goodson and Radwan provide 
a useful synopsis of the roles of the Egyptian cabinet and bureaucracy, the People’s 
Assembly, the judiciary, legislature, and the informal ties that connect them.  
 
Kassem’s study takes a historical view that outlines the shoring up of the powers of the 
presidency through Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak’s terms in office. This process coincided 
with the emergence of a multiparty system. For example, after Sadat’s introduction of a 
multiparty system, only 20 percent of bills passed were initiated by the legislature, the rest by 
the executive branch of government (Kassem 2004:24). During Mubarak’s government, in 
1987, 98.5 percent of legislative bills were initiated by the executive. This was the height of 
multiparty participation in the Egyptian government, as the opposition acquired a number 
parliamentary seats in the 1987 elections (which were lost in subsequent elections) (Kassem 
2004:29-30).  
 
Kassem notes that, “while signs of ‘liberalization’ were evident in the 1980s, the fundamental 
structure of the system was in reality unchanged” (Kassem 2004:30). This is largely because, 
as both Kassem (2004) and Goodson and Radwan (1997) underline, all important policies or 
projects must be endorsed by the president or by a government body affiliated with the 
presidential establishment. As Egypt is formally a parliamentary republic, so there should be 
close links between the cabinet headed by the prime minister and the legislature, but both are 
dominated by the president (Goodson and Radwan 1997:4). 
 
 61
Kassem identifies three means by which the presidency maintained its dominant role. 
Procedurally, Article 153 (see Table ) enabled Mubarak to circumvent parliamentary 
procedures to have bills enacted into law. A second tactic is the manipulation of schedules, 
including the scheduling of sensitive laws on Saturday, when legislators are usually absent, or 
failing to include an item on the agenda altogether. A third tactic is the lifting of immunity 
on the part of members of parliament who, for example, refuse to be coopted into the 
National Democratic Party (NDP), the ruling party which independents are encouraged to 
join once they win their seats. Those who do overcome electoral impediments tend to play 
passive roles within the legislature (with 250 out of 454 members not participating in the 
legislative process in any way during the 1996-97 parliamentary session (Kassem 2004:31-35).  
 
The presidency is responsible for appointing judges, including those of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court. The judiciary attempts to preserve its independence despite various 
governmental constraints, though “is forced to maintain a fine balance between its rulings 
and their political implications” (Kassem 2004:36). Ultimately, the president is able to 
circumvent rulings that are seen as obstructive to the regime’s objectives (Kassem 2004:37).  
 
Emergency law and political participation 
 
A state of emergency, that has been in place in Egypt since the assassination of Sadat in 1981 
and renewed every three years since, enables the government to control every level of 
political activity. The state of emergency differs from martial law in that the courts continue 
to function and the Constitution is not suspended. Emergency law does allow for censorship 
over political activity, ranging from monitoring political activity to limiting political 
expression. Further, individuals can be arrested for distributing political literature or 
gathering in groups of five or more people without government authorization, or on the 
basis of suspicion of political crimes (Kassem 2004:37). A person can be held in detention 
without a formal court hearing indefinitely. The president is also able to circumvent the 
civilian courts and refer any case to the military judiciary, which does not allow for appeal, 
including in sentences of death (Kassem 2004:37-38).  
 
Emergency law makes it difficult for political parties to function outside their own offices. 
Campaign gatherings are not allowed without prior consent from the Ministry of Interior 
and the location of intended gatherings are determined (through Article 7 of Law 14 of 
1923) by the Ministry. The police have the further right to attend and dissolve any meeting in 
session and to arrest individuals participating in legitimate activities such as legislative or 
syndicate elections (Kassem 2004:56, 38). Arrest and imprisonment is risked by candidates 
who advocate any changes to the basic principles of the constitution (see penal code articles 
in Table…). Kassem notes that the articles of the penal code enable broad interpretation and 
present constraints for political participation (Kassem 2004:57). 
 
Prior to the 1995 legislative elections, the security forces arrested 54 Muslim Brotherhood 
leaders. Kassem contends that it was largely as a consequence of this that only one Islamist 
oriented candidate won his seat in the elections. Arrests were repeated before the 2000 
elections, with one reporting commenting that, “Mass Brotherhood trials have become 
something of an election-year tradition in Egypt” (Kassem 2004:38). What is notable is the 
use of military courts to try civilians regardless of whether or not they fit the ‘terrorist’ 
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description; there are currently between 12,000 and 15,000 political prisoners in Egyptian 
prisons (Kassem 2004:40).  
 
Kassem’s study clearly indicates how emergency law was bolstered by the expanding of 
police responsibilities to include a prominent role in supervising voting and ballot counting 
in local and legislative elections (Kassem 2004:40, 41). The police have prevented voters 
from entering voting stations in constituencies with popular opposition candidates. At the 
same time, military and police personnel are prohibited from voting or joining political 
parties. In exchange, police and military are given subsidies and control over “huge projects” 
in the development of human resources and infrastructure, all of which have rendered the 
police and military very important backers of and sources of stability for the Mubarak regime 
(Kassem 2004:42-43). In short, emergency law has been employed not only to respond to 




Nasser adopted a single party system in 1952 in which the party was seen by the government 
as a means of mobilizing political participation rather than as a vehicle for popular 
participation (Kassem 2004:51). Although opposition parties have been functioning legally in 
Egypt since 1976, liberalization of the political system that followed under Sadat was shaped 
more by economic and political interests than by a desire for democratization (Kassem 
2004:53). Law 40 (see Table..) restricts the role of political parties is seen as testimony of 
this. The vagueness of the law means that it can be used to reject almost any attempt to 
create a new party (Kassem 2004:53). Only one of fifty applications to form a new political 
party has been approved during Mubarak’s presidency and the Political Parties Committee 
has suspended seven political parties since 1998 (Kassem 2004:57-58). One example is the 
Social Labour Party, which changed its name to the Labour Party in its adoption of an 
increasingly Islamist orientation, whose status was suspended by the PPC over “party in-
fighting and disputes over leadership of the party” (Kassem 2004:59). The NGO, Egypt: For 
Culture and Dialogue, applied for and obtained NGO status after numerous failed attempts 
to form as a political party (Kassem 2004:58).  
 
Egypt has sixteen legal political parties and the Mulsim Brotherhood, which is an illegal but 
tolerated opposition movement. But the various constraints on party formation and 
participation, political parties in Egypt are weak and underdeveloped and, moreover, 
excluded from policymaking processes (Goodson and Radwan 1997:7; Kassem 2004:76). 
Opposition parties are weak and poorly organized, and have great difficulty building a base 
of support at the grassroots level toward challenging the current clientelist structure of 
Egyptian politics (Goodson and Radwan 1997:7; Kassem 2004:80). Kassem contends that, as 
a result, political parties “resemble little more than a conglomerate of personalities 
possessing their personal networks of supporters. It is not uncommon for party members to 
switch political affiliation to suit their personal interests or compete against each other in 
elections” (Kassem 2004:80-81). Because of the weakness of opposition parties, most 
independent candidates join Mubarak’s governing party, the National Democratic Party 
(NDP) once they gain their seat (Goodson and Radwan 1997:7). For example, following the 




There have been widespread electoral irregularies, which have bolstered NDP dominance of 
the People’s Assembly (Goodson and Radwan 1997:7). Continually changing electoral laws, 
as well as covert and overt obstruction by the government and police during campaigning 
and voting (such as preventing voters from entering polling stations), constrain popular 
participation and grant the government the right to exclude independent candidates (Kassem 
2004:60-76).  
 
Civil society  
 
Like the rest of the Arab world, civil society in Egypt has been hindered by the authoritarian 
nature of the Egyptian political system. Law 32, the take-over of the Waqf (Islamic public 
and private endowments) by the state served to incorporate associations into formal state 
structures or render them obsolete. Exceptions are trade unions and professional 
associations.  
 
In 1952, there were about 500 trade unions with a membership of 150,000; within five years 
their numbers increased to 1350 unions with a membership of 430,000 (Kassem 2004:89-
91). Another exception is human rights organizations, some of which remain legally 
unrecognized. Egyptian civil society is “more consenting than participating” (Goodson and 
Radwan 1997:8). 
 
In 1999, Law 153 came into force and was invalidated in 2002. But, despite an NGO 
campaign, in June 2002, a revised, more restricted version of the law was passed by the 
People’s Assembly by 426 out of 454 votes. It was seen as a response by the government to 
NGO criticism of the state, and was more restrictive than its predecessor, Law No. 32.  
Under law 153, all NGOs not officially registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs are 
illegal. Members of unauthorized organizations are deemed criminal offenders, and 
registered NGOs must fulfill numerous requirements, including joining a federation of 
NGOs, accept onto their board an official from the Ministry of Social Affairs, and refrain 
from all activities of a ‘political nature.’ Also, all external funds must go through the Ministry 
of Social Affairs before dispensed to NGOs (Grunert 2003:140). 
 
Membership in organizations or networks outside the country is also prohibited without 
prior government permission, and donor institutions are required to register with the 
Egyptian government (Grunert 2003:141,148). This means, reports Grunert, that “the 
funding decisions of non-registered donor agencies depend completely on the goodwill of 
the ministries” (Grunert 2003:143). This recent legislation renders previous pronouncements 
that the nongovernmental sector in Egypt was increasingly able to operate “outside the long 
shadow historically cast by the dominant Egyptian state” (Goodson and Radwan 1997:8). 




The government established the General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions (GFETU) in 
1957, and the bestowing of worker protection and benefits is seen as part of the 
government’s “pattern of enticing labor support while strengthing the policies of 
containment and control” which continued through the 1960s (Kassem 2004:92). The 1970s 
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brought Law 3, which introduced prison terms with hard labour for striking, and Law 35, 
which increased government control over the union structure (Kassem 2004:101-102). By 
the early 1980s, most of the 120 leftist union representatives were in prison (Kassem 
2004:102).  
 
In 1991, a comprehensive economic reform and structural adjustment program (ERSAP) 
was introduced which transferred public enterprises over to the private sector. This program 
necessitated the reduction of the labour force in order to increase sale prospects and 




Unlike labour, professional syndicates benefited from the ERSAP as they converted their 
revenues into private investments (Kassem 2004:103). Professional syndicates have also 
fallen under state control in various ways, in efforts to coopt them. The electoral victories of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in the Doctors Syndicate in 1992 was perceived as a threat to the 
government. This was quickly followed by the efficiency with which the Engineers Synicate 
responded to the 1992 earthquake that hit Cairo. The government responded with, amongst 
other measures, Law 100 which requires 50 percent turnout for syndicate elections and, if 
this turnout was not reached, the state appointment of board members. The supervision of 
syndicate elections, under this law, passed to the judiciary (Kassem 2004:114). Kassem 
contends that,  
regime interference was precisely intended to hinder democratic development in 
order to maintain the government’s monopoly on power. The government did not 
pursue professional syndicates because of their Islamist affiliation, but rather because 
these entities were showing signs of independence and character. It would not have 
pursued the syndicates with any less vigor had there been a secular liberal group 
instead of an Islamist group at the forefront of these events (Kassem 2004:117). 
 
Kassem’s study is useful in that it focuses on particular instances and case studies that 
illustrate ways in which the authoritarian policies of the Egyptian government have hindered 
the emergence of autonomous organizations in Egypt and, moreover, have produced 
“abnormal and erratic patterns of behavior within civil society” (Kassem 2004:58). Some of 
these patterns are increased labour strikes and riots that reflect a despair of the labour force 
with union and formal channels of communication and protest. Another is the formation of 
associations by opposition parties unable to attain official registration (such as Egypt: For 
Culture and Dialogue) (Kassem 2004:58, 126). A more drastic result of the state’s 
authoritarian measures is the increase in radical Islamist groups and support (discussed 
below). 
 
Human rights organizations 
 
On the part of the Egyptian government, international support for service-sector NGOs is 
welcome in as much as it alleviates its financial burden. Additionally, strengthening popular 
secular forums became a means of countering the increasing influence of Islamists, the most 
powerful opposition force confronting the state (Grunert 2003:139). Human rights 
organizations, on the other hand, are viewed with suspicion by the state. As one senior 
Egyptian government official noted,  
 65
Human rights means having the right to pray, the right to your religion, the freedom 
of work, the freedom of movement… How can [human rights] organizations get 
involved with the politics of the state and say there is freedom or no freedom? This 
is none of their business (Kassem 2004:119). 
 
The human rights movement in Egypt started at the end of the 1970s, with a politicized 
student movement and a degree of tolerance within Sadat’s policy of infitah (a policy of 
political opening). Students of law pressed for the abolition of emergency laws and decrees 
passed under the Nasser government (Grunert 2003:135). The first two Egyptian human 
rights organizations were set up as mouthpieces of the government in the late 1970s; one of 
these, Partisans Association of Human Rights in Cairo (PAHRC) continues to issue press 
releases in response to accusations of human rights violations by other organizations 
(Kassem 2004:119).  
 
By the mid-1980s, activists began to set up independent organizations. These attracted left-
wing party members with the end of the cold war’s ideological disorientation (Grunert 
2003:135). The Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR) and the Egyptian 
Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) were established in 1985 and 1987 respectively. 
Under Law 32, the government used the existence of PAHRC to refuse official recognition 
to the EOHR (Kassem 2004:119-120).  
 
 
International donors and the promotion of civil society 
 
On the basis of interviews with 23 nongovernmental human rights and donor organizations 
in Cairo in 2002, Grunert provides an important examination of the interests and 
expectations behind NGO and donor cooperation, and the impact of Law No. 153, the new 
‘Law of Associations’ that has regulated the activities of NGOs and impacted NGO-donor 
relations since 1999.  
 
Grunert notes that international support for civil organizations became acceptable to the 
state as donors made the development of a stable democracy a condition of financial 
assistance for Egypt’s integration into the world market (Grunert 2003:138). With this 
leverage, international agencies could take on the role of patrons to Egyptian NGOs. The 
commitment of human rights organizations to international conventions and what was 
perceived to be western values, meant they were seen as ‘partners’ of the West. They were 
also seen as natural mediators between the state and civil society. By the mid-1990s, they 
received the bulk of international donor support to Egyptian NGOs (Grunert 2003:138-39). 
 
More than 15 new human rights organizations have been established since the mid-1990s, 
the majority dependent on external funding. The context of the new NGOs differs from that 
of their emergence in the late 1970s in that they emerged in the midst of a general feeling of 
mistrust of the Egyptian state and as a direct response to increasing human rights violations. 
Many of the human rights violations taken up by human rights organizations involve 
Islamists. These violations are increasingly addressed by NGOs in projects that do not 
involve donors, so as to avoid compromising them in their necessary mediation between the 
state and the NGOs (Grunert 2003:138).  
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The ‘Law of Associations,’ Law 153 (its provisions are outlined above) has regulated the 
activities of NGOs and impacted NGO-donor relations since 1999. The law has also 
fractured NGO community, with some NGOs deciding to fall in with the regulations and 
others refusing to register and accept the controls (Grunert 2003:141). The Hisham Mubarak 
Law Centre split in two, with the Association for Human Rights to Legal Aid registering 
official, while the remaining Hisham Centre continuing as usual and, hence, considered 
illegal (Grunert 2003:141). A mutual distrust has grown between organizations who chose to 
register and those who have not, and cooperation such as exchange of information has 
ceased (Grunert 2003:142).  
 
Interestingly, organizations that chose to register reported that they felt they could make this 
compromise only with the moral backing of their international partner organizations, which 
they counted on for support in potential crisis situations (Grunert 2003:142). Such a 
situation arose in the arrest of 28 employees of the Ibn Khaldun Centre in May 2001, and 
the sentencing of its chairman, Said ed-Din Ibrahim, to seven years in prison (charges were 
dropped but he was subsequently charged again and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment 
in June 2002). The centre was charged with accepting funds for an EU-sponsored program 
to observe the parliamentary elections of 2000. Ibrahim holds dual American and Egyptian 
citizenship, hence his arrest is seen as a response to American criticism of human rights 
violations in Egypt (Grunert 2003:142).  
 
The case points to the precarious legal framework of bilateral contracts between donors and 
Egyptian NGOs and the need for donors (when not registered with the appropriate ministry 
to make special arrangements and rely on the good will of contacts. This is especially the 
case with the German political foundations, which are considered by the Egyptian 
government to be neither state, nor private institutes (Grunert 2003:142, 143).  
 
It also highlights the importance of the monitoring role that international donors play. 
Although, Grunert notes, this monitoring role was found to be too demanding for most of 
the donors and many shifted toward less politicized projects (Grunert 2003:144).  
 
Following September 11, human rights organizations in Egypt which protested against the 
unlawful treatment of Islamists, who were arrested in large numbers without charges 
brought against them, lost both the financial as well as the moral backing of international 
donors. Without this moral backing, NGOs and activists faced greater risks and most opted 
to develop programs which would not entail confrontation with the Egyptian government 
(Grunert 2003145). NGOs also increasingly adopted the less politicized agendas of donors, 
including the promotion of inter-religious dialogue (Grunert 2003:145).  
 
Some Egyptian human rights organizations have refused to register and are attempting to 
restructure their programs so they are not dependent on international donors and are more 
interlinked with other Arab human rights organizations outside the country. Others, have 
registered by fell under the suspicion and coersive practices of the Egyptian state 
nonetheless. One of these is the Group for Democratic Development (GDD). The GDD’s 
Teachers for Democracy project, sponsored by the Danish International Development 
Agency (DANIDA), aimed to provide teachers “with the necessary communication skills 
and training to disseminate democratic values among their pupils” (Kassem 2004:124). The 
GDD sent the program evaluation and findings to the Ministry of Education with an offer 
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to assist in the ministry’s future teacher training programs. The minister of education 
responded by, among measures to discredit and alienate the DGG, issuing an order to 
deduct two week’s salary from each of the 100 teachers’ pay cheque, and having 30 of the 
participants arrested and interrogated by state security forces (Kassem 2003:125). Unable to 
contend with the hostile measures of the government, the GDD eventually voluntarily 




Kassem outlines the emergence of political Islam in Egypt, noting its initial establishment in 
1928 with the creation of the Muslim Brothers (Muslim Brotherhood) by Hassan al-Banna. 
Influenced by earlier Islamic thinkers and reformers, the Muslim Brotherhood did not 
initially reject the established political order (Kassem 2004:134-35). Beyond its goal of 
Islamic “moral and social” reform, its nationalist defense (with regard to Palestine, the Suez, 
and British evacuation) increased their legitimacy and respect beyond their sectarian focus 
(Kassem 2004:1235). Its prominent members competed in the 1942 legislative elections but 
all were defeated because of government manipulation. Kassem notes that “the tense and 
antagonistic relationships between the state and the Brotherhood increased in proportion to 
the latter’s popularity and growth” (Kassem 2004:135). In 1948, they were dissolved and 
responded by assassinating the Egyptian prime minister. Kassem notes that their violent 
response was not an exclusively Islamist phenomenon but connected to the desperation 
cxreated by wider socioeconomic and political discontent (Kassem 2004:136). Al-Banna was 
subsequently ambushed and killed by the new prime minister.  
 
Kassem notes that the state used both ‘cooperative’ and ‘coercive’ tactics with the 
Brotherhood, which proved useful in countering other opponents and external threats (such 
as the Arab Israeli conflict) (Kassem 2004:137). The Nasser government crushed the 
Brotherhood, which resulted in a reactionary Islamic ideology by the late 1960s, as reflected 
in the works of Sayyid Qutb (Kassem 2004:138-39). Qutb was “a very liberal writer” until he 
was sentenced to 15 years in prison during which time he was tortured and 21 of his prison 
mates massacred. He emerged with a belief in a radical political theology of violence and 
isolation (Kassem 2004:139). Sadat attempted a reconciliation with the Muslim Brotherhood 
in the 1970s, releasing prisoners and encouraging exiles to return. The organization remained 
illegal but was allowed to rebuild itself. In the meantime, two groups with younger members 
emerged, Al-Jama’ al-Islamiya and Tamzim al-Jihad and later formed an alliance. Conflict 
between the state and Islamists reached a peak in September 1981 when Sadat arrested 1500 
intellectual, religious and political individuals, most of whom were Islamists (Kassem 
2004:144). Mubarak’s regime “has produced an unprecedented expansion of politically 
motivated violence involving Islamists and an upsurge in the number of Islamist prisoners” 
which contributed to the movements move from religious fundamentalism to political 
terrorism (Kassem 2004:145). The movement was also making gains in formal politics, 
winning, respectively, eight and then 38 seats in the 1984 and 1987 legislative elections. Mass 
arrests just prior to the 1987 elections did not prevent the gains of the Brotherhood, which 
comprised nine percent of the vote, or more than half a million votes (Kassem 2004:148, 
151).  
 
Mass and indiscriminate arrests (including of female family members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood) reflect the government’s assumption that wholesale repression would “solve 
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the matter once and for all”; but, as Kassem points out, such a coercive and ultimately 
unsuccessful strategy underlines the insecurity and fragility of authoritarian rule (Kassem 
2004:152). Indeed, mounting state violence resulted in the emergence of violence against the 
security forces that was, interestingly, personally rather than politically motivated--as 
individuals reacted to the wrongs and humiliation they endured (Kassem 2004:153).  
 
Kassem’s study outlines this spiral of violence, noting how the state responded by amending 
the penal code to expand the application of the death penalty and the definition of terrorism 
to include “spreading panic” and “obstructing the work of authorities” (Kassem 2004:155). 
(These resulted in greater violence on the part of the Brotherhood. By 2001, there were an 
estimated 15,000 to 20,000 Islamist political prisoners (Kassem 2004:155-56).) In brief, the 
militant forms of political Islam did not emerge in a vacuum in Egypt; the role of the state, 
as well as general political disillusionment, poverty, unemployment, alienation, and other 
socioeconomic factors, have increased its appeal (Kassem 2004:163).  
 
Kassem describes the effects of the post 9/11 environment on the international 
community’s role. Specifically, its role has waned leaving human rights advocates are 
vulnerable. As one activist explained, “by simply defending human rights by taking a stand 
against torture or military trials for civilians, I am placed in the position where I am accused 
of defending terrorism” (Kassem 2004:182).  
  
Summary findings of the literature: 
 
While Egypt fairs better than the rest of the Arab world, with the exception of the 
Palestinian territories, civil liberties and political rights have worsened since 1990 (Goodson 
and Radwan 1997:10). The literature indicates that freedom of speech, freedom of religion, 
police control, freedom of association and the emergency law all represent areas in which 
there has been no or negative progress (Goodson and Radwan 1997:10).  
 
The absence of organizational autonomy presents a challenge to donors, as does the 
combination of repression and cooptation that has served to weaken political parties and the 
multiparty system in Egypt. The government’s strategy of containing and controlling popular 
participation in the political system has prevented a broad-based opposition from forming 
and contributed to the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood. In turn, state violence and 
repression has spawned greater extremism on the part of Islamists. The realm of civil society 
has become increasingly constrained since 9/11, and NGOs as well as donors are caught in a 
bind whereby the promotion of democratic ideals and practices can be perceived as a threat 
by the government.  
 
The precarious legal framework for both donors and nongovernmental organizations points 
to the need to foster wider conditions for civil society development, and the importance of 
indirect and moral support to organizations. 
 
 





1953 – empowered the Revolutionary Central Command (RCC) to 







1956 – replaced a parliamentary system with a presidential Republican 
system in which the president appoints and dismisses ministers (enabled 
Nasser to replace Free Officers with civilians) 








Remains in effect today and enshrines the preeminence of the presidency 
over legislative and judiciary branches of government; 
Article 93 gives the National Assembly authority to determine the validity 
of its elections and the credentials of its members, thus undermining the 
representative function of the legislature and maintaining NDP hegemony 
in parliament. 
Article 88 of 
Constitution; 
Articles 24,25 




States voting should be supervised by the judiciary, but is undermined by 
Article 25 of Law 73 (1956) which limits judiciary supervision to the main 
voting locations and not subsidiary voting stations; Article 24 requires 








Authorize imprisonment for “anyone in Egypt who advocates, in any way, 
the changing of basic principles of the constitution…who shouts or sings 
in public with the purpose of inciting dissent” or dissemination “false or 
instigating news, information, or rumors that disturb the public peace, 
frighten people, or harm the public interest.” 
Article 153 of 






allows, in urgent cases, a vote to be put to a final vote at the same sitting in 
which it was approved. Was used to pass 55.7 percent of all bills enacted 
into law during the 1997-1998 legislative session. 
Law 46 (1972) Kassem 
2004:36 
Gives the presidency responsibility for appointing and promoting judges, 
including Supreme Constitutional Court judges, and appointing the public 
prosecutor, attorney generals, and Court of Cassation judges. The 
president also presides over  
Law 81 (1969) Kassem 
2004:19 
Provided for an independent judicial body (Supreme Constitutional Court) 
to supervise the constitutionality of laws, though stipulated that SCC 
judges be appointed directly by the president 
Labour Legislation 
Law 3 (1977) Kassem 
2004:102 
Increased the penalty for striking to imprisonment with hard labour 
Law 12 (1991) Kassem 
2004:109 
Further weakened the link between workers and unions; served to secure 
the union positions of co-opted union leaders 
Law 12 (2003) Kassem 
2004:110 
Unified labour law, includes the right to strike (though only if approved by 
the GFETU; shortened paid holiday and maternity leave; greater ability of 
employer to hire and fire employees; and pay increases linked to market 
profits. 




Reinforced government control over the union structure, including 
alienating union officials from their constituents and increasing their 
dependence on government 
Civil Society Legislation 
Law 32 (1964) Kassem Requires civil associations to register with the Ministry of Social Affairs, 
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2004:88-89 not engage in political activities; they can be prohibited if its founding is 
“not in accord with security measures” or if its work duplicates the services 
of another association. Seen as a mechanism for the Ministry to exclude 
unwanted organizations from civil participation. 
Law 84 Kassem 
2004:122 
Not yet ratified; “a carbon copy of Law 153” passed via the formal 
channels that had proclaimed Law 153 unconstitutional 
Law 93 Kassem 
2004:31 
Passed in 1995, provides for harsh penalties and prison sentences for the 









Stipulates all NGOs not officially registered with the Ministry of Social 
Affairs are illegal. Members of unauthorized organizations are deemed 
criminal offenders, and registered NGOs must fulfill requirements such as 
join a federation of NGOs, accept onto their board an official from the 
Ministry of Social Affairs, and refrain from all activities of a ‘political 
nature.’ Also, external funds must go through the Ministry of Social Affairs 
before dispensed to NGOs. Proclaimed unconstitutional in 2002, hence 
government reverted to Law 32 with regard to the denial of EOHR’s and 
other organizations’ legal recognition 
Electoral and Political Party Legislation 





Political parties can only be established if their goals, principles and 
programs do not conflict with shari’a principles, national unity, and public 
order and are distinct from those of other parties. Political parties and their 
leaders are forbidden from having links to organizations abroad. Also 
prevents religious parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood or Coptic 





Electoral system changed from individual candidacy to party-list (and from 
first past the post to proportional representation); constituencies changed 
from 176 to 48; and a minimum requirement of 8 percent of the 







The state of freedom of association in Iran remains precarious and in the grip of both institutional and 
existential crises. Iran remains a post-revolutionary society with high popular expectations that the state 
must be more answerable to the population. The state, meanwhile, has institutionally protected itself against 
wider accountability. Low voter turnout in recent elections are seen as a harbinger of both popular 
disaffection and increasing state fragility. Women and youth are seen as critical catalysts of any future pro-
democracy movement. Last year’s election brought in a conservative parliament that promptly rejected 
reform proposals and introduced new restrictions. The following discussion outlines political and social 
institutions and fissures in Iran that impact on civil society and political activism. 
 
Freedom of association and expression 
 
Amnesty International reports that freedom of expression and association in Iran is curtailed by legal 
restrictions and by structural flaws in the judicial system, including compromised independence of the 
judicial system. The result has been extensive unfair trials and imprisonment of prisoners of conscience 
(http://web.amnesty.org/web/content.nsf/pages/gbr_Iran_freedom). 
 
Iran’s Constitution guarantees freedom of belief, yet restrictions on freedom of expression and association 
in Iranian law serve to side step both the Iranian Constitution and international human rights treaties which 
Iran has signed onto. Restrictive, contradictory and vaguely worded provisions contained in the Penal Code, 
as well as the Theologicans’ Law, a body of law that deals with offences committed by clerics, and the Public 
and Revolutionary Courts’ Procedural Law also undermine the right to freedom of expression, including the 
prohibition of a range of activities connected with journalism or public discourse which do not amount to 
criminal offences.  
 
Reportedly, efforts by Iran’s judiciary to curtail freedom of expression and association are now increasingly 
encroaching on human rights defenders and civil society activists. Last November, Mahboubeh 
Abbasgholizadeh, the editor of Farzaneh, a women’s rights journal was arrested at her home on 2 




In 1979, a revolution led by the Ayatollah Khomeini established a theocratic Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) 
by popular vote. This was followed by destructive Iran-Iraq war was waged between 1980 and 1988. A year 
later, revisions to the constitution expanded the powers of the presidency and eliminated the prime 
ministership. The constitution codifies Islamic principles of government. Political parties have not been 
permitted since 1988. The following table illustrates relationships of governing bodies to each other and is 










The electorate is comprised of people over the age of 15, including women, but their choice 
is limited by the fact that the theocratic structure of the state predetermines who can stand 
for elections. Women and young people were the main bloc of voters who elected reformist 
President Mohammad Khatami in 1997. In the recent elections in March 2005, voter turnout 
dropped significantly (according to Khameini, to 50%) (“Political Islam” 2004).   
 
The president is elected for four years and can serve no more than two consecutive terms, 
and serves as the second-highest ranking official in the country. He heads the executive 
branch of power and is responsible for the government’s adherence to the constitution. In 
practice, the president, currently Ali Mohammad Khatami-Ardakani (since 3 August 1997), is 
constrained by clerics and conservatives and the authority of the Supreme Leader.  
 
The cabinet, or Council of Ministers, are chosen by the president and approved by 
parliament, which can also impeach them. Members’ decisions are heavily monitored by 
conservatives watching for any deviation from their strict Islamic line.  
 
Members of the majlis, parliament, or consultative assembly are elected by popular vote 
every four years. The parliament has 290 seats, and can introduce and pass laws, as well as to 
summon and impeach ministers or the president. However, all its bills must pass approval by 
the conservative Guardian Council. Further, all candidates are vetted by the Guardian 
Council before being able to stand for parliamentary elections. While the February 2000 
elections saw reformists gain a majority, the February 2004 elections were effectively 
boycotted by the reformists and resulted in conservatives dominating the parliament. Prior 
to the elections, 2000 candidates were excluded (“Political Islam” 2004).  
 
The regime’s control over who can stand for election is effected through two ‘tests’: 
candidates have to be (and presumably demonstrate they are) committed to the Islamic state, 
and further be in agreement with the policies of the ruling group (Kazemi 1996:139). Kazemi 
rightly points out that these to restrictions need to be eliminated if parliament were to 
develop into an institution that could facilitate civil society (Kasemi 1996:139). The February 
2004 elections resulted in a conservative dominated parliament that promptly moved to 
reject proposals to expand women’s rights and adopt a UN convention on women’s rights 
(Fathi 2004:17).  
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The Guardian Council is the most influential body and is currently controlled by 
conservatives. It is responsible for ensuring parliament does not pass laws that are deemd 
out of step with Shi’a-Islamic precepts. In practice, it has used its power to veto laws not in 
the interests of the state (Kazemi 2003:87). It has six theologians appointed by the Supreme 
Leader and six jurists nominated by the judiciary and approved by parliament. Members are 
elected for six years and approve all bills passed by parliament, ensuring they conform to the 
constitution and Islamic law. The council, as mentioned above, also vets all candidates in 
elections to parliament, the presidency and the Assembly of Experts. Reformists have 
attempted to reduce its vetting power. Kazemi contends that the Guardian Council has 
“become a most significant institutional barrier to the emergence of a counter-elite in Iranian 
politics. Its chief function has been to preserve the clerical rule and the dominant status quo 
power arrangements” (Kazemi 2003:87). 
 
The Assembly of Experts appoints the Supreme Leader, monitors his performance and can 
remove him if he is deemed incapable of fulfilling his duties. Only clerics can join the 
assembly and candidates for election are vetted by the Guardian Council. The assembly is 
dominated by conservatives.  
 
The Supreme Leader is elected by the clerics of the Assembly of Experts and serves for 
life. Currently Ayatollah Ali Hoseini-Khamenei (since 4 June 1989), the supreme leader 
appoints the head of the judiciary, six of the members of the powerful Guardian Council, the 
commanders of all the armed forces, Friday prayer leaders and the head of radio and TV. He 
also confirms the president's election. Periodic tension between the office of the leader (head 
of state) and the office of the president (head of government) has often been a source of 
political instability and reflects deeper tensions between religious rule and the democratic 
aspirations of most Iranians.  
 
The armed forces, comprising the Revolutionary Guard and the regular forces, are 
appointed by and answerable to the supreme leader. The Revolutionary Guard also has a 
powerful presence in other institutions, and controls volunteer militias with branches in 
every town. Until early last century, the Iranian judiciary was controlled by the clergy. The 
system was later secularised, but after the revolution the Supreme Court revoked all previous 
laws that were deemed un-Islamic and replaced with Sharia laws. The head of the judiciary 
also reports to the supreme leader.  
 
Its members appointed by the supreme leader, the Expediency Council (or Discretionary 
Council) is an advisory body for the Leader with adjudicating power in disputes over 
legislation between the parliament and the Guardian Council. It was created by Khomeini in 
1988 to resolve disputes between the Guardian Council, parliament, and the executive 
branch. It is seen as a “safety valve for protecting the clerical system’s integrity and viability” 
and “further ensures that divisions in the ruling class do not spill into the public domain” 




Under the Shah, Kazemi notes, the Iranian state functioned with a high degree of autonomy 
in the 1960s and 70s, operating without social input through such mechanisms as political 
parties, popularly elected legislatures, a free press and local political activity (Kazemi 
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1996:121). The scope of civil society activities was restricted. A tradition of religious 
institutional and economic autonomy persisted, though, with religious institutions eventually 
becoming an important factor in the Shah’s demise (Kazemi 1996:122).  
 
The Islamic revolution brought together divers social groupings in a large coalition that 
eventually toppled the Iranian monarchy. The state became the main arm of the Islamic 
nation and debates ensued as to the meaning of an Islamic state and the relationship of the 
state and judiciary to the Islamic society (Kazemi 1996:123). These debates were ‘solved’ 
when, in 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini declared the state to be paramount to the community. 
Khomeini introduce the Sunni concept of maslaha which provides for the unconditional 
authority of the Islamic state in all matters concerning the Islamic community. He also 
created the Expediency Council (sometimes referred to as the Discretionary Council) to 
resolve disputes among government bodies.  
 
Political and religious authority is in the person of the supreme leader and the state is able to 
bypass constitutional safeguards as well as the Guardian Council (Kazemi 1996:133-34). 
Kazemi notes that the effect is that the state is able to violate citizens’ rights for the sake of 
common good (Kazemi 1996:124-25). Further, the concept of citizenship becomes a matter 
of religiosity and conditional on an individual’s level of support to the state. This puts in 
peril individual rights and ensures “at least potentially for intermittent or systematic violation 
of individual rights when they are perceived to serve the larger purposes of a well-defined 
community” (Kazemi 1996:125). 
 
Constraints on individual freedoms in Iran have been well documented and highlight the fact 
that the legal framework itself provides no recourse for individuals. The rights of religious 
minorities (in particular the Baha’is, which are the largest religious minority) and women are 
further particularly constrained by formal and informal restrictions—as well as by the Islamic 
identity of the state. Iran is characterized by a particularly stark divide between private and 
public spheres, whereby the population’s adherence to the dictates of the state are 
elaborately policed, while an increasingly disaffected population eschews these controls in 
private spaces in favour of ‘Western’ cultural liberties. 
 
Voices of protest are heard from both disadvantaged religious minorities and women, as well 
as from those who believe in an Islamic order but do not support the rule of the clerics 
(Kazemi 2003:94). Kazemi  states, also, that: 
…in spite of sustained efforts, the regime has failed to fully Islamize Iranian society. 
The implication of this failure is potentially quite severe, as more and more of the 
youth and others become disenchanted with the place of Islam in the social order. 
This may well turn out to be the regime’s Achilles heel with strong negative 




There is an extensive literature on women in Iran.9 The following discussion summarizes the 
context of women’s rights and highlights the question of strategic alliances between secular 
and nonsecular women’s movements. 




The Family Protection Law of 1967 (modified in 1975) restricted polygyny and reformed 
divorce and custody laws; it also increased the role of civil courts which served also to 
marginalize the role of the clergy. These reforms resulted in a vocal Islamist opposition 
(Shahidian 2002a:69). The revolution that ensued (between 1977 and 1979) was widely 
supported by women (see Moghadam 2004). Following the revolution, many laws which 
offered some protection to women were repealed. The Family Protection Law was 
abrogated. The age of marriage was lowered to nine for girls, temporary marriage was 
reinstituted along with men’s ability to unilaterally divorce, family planning was abolished, 
and women were barred from several professions (such as attorney and judge) and fields of 
study. The hejab, the most visible form of the state’s control over women’s bodies, was 
variously imposed (Shahidian 2002a:112; Moghadam 2004:460-62). 
 
Mehrdad Khonsari, leader of the constitutionalist Movement of Iran, notes also that the 
rates of prostitution and drug abuse by women are high and rising; a woman’s testimony is 
worth half of that of a man’s; women lose guardianship of their children to their husband’s 
family upon the death of their husbands; and women are not allowed to go abroad to study 
(Women in Iran 2001:132) (although the last restriction has been challenged by women and 
the law now states that women can go abroad but require the permission of their fathers).  
 
Hammed Shahidian’s two volumes (Women in Iran: Gender Politics in the Islamic Republic and 
Women in Iran: Emerging Voices in the Women’s Movement, both 2002) discuss gender relations 
in Iran from the 1960s and women’s strategies of resistance. Drawing on sociological 
theories of culture, patriarchy and conflict, he focuses on state-level politics, the women’s 
movement, and the Iranian left. Shahidian contends the Islamic government is seeking “to 
revive private patriarchy in all its tyrannical forms” (Shahidian 2002a:3).  
  
Shahidian’s books provide a critical analysis of the politics of gender and sexuality in Iran, 
and examine discourses of Islamic and secular feminism. His conclusion, though, is 
problematic. Shehadian argues that Islam is essentially patriarchal and that Islamic feminists 
perpetuate Islamic patriarchy and undermine the efforts of secular feminists. His assessment 
is that Islamic feminists and reformists engage in a defeatist politics of compromise rather 
than cultural innovation. He proposes, instead, “clean ruptures from much of our cultural 
and social past” (Shehidian 2002b:166). Fatemeh Ebtehaj, in her review of Shehadian’s two 
volumes, makes an important point that would indicate that activists can both draw on and 
help change cultural contexts. Ebtehaj states, 
…secular forces, instead of being weakened by Islamic feminists as Shahidian argues, 
can in fact draw on their arguments to question the absolutist base of religious 
rulings and to highlight the limitations of a legal system based in religion. They can 
also point to the factional differences within the Islamic republic and use these as 
evidence that political power undermines the authority and legitimacy of religion, 
thereby strengthening their demands for the separation of religion from the state, 
and for equal rights for all citizens, regardless of religious belief (Ebthaj 2005:118). 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 These include: Afsaneh Najmabadi (1991), “Hazards of modernity and morality: women and morality; women 
state and ideology in contemporary Iran,” in Women, Islam, and the State, edited by D. Kandiyoti. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press; Nesta Ramazani (1993), “Women in Iran: the revolutionary ebb and flow,” Middle 
East Journal, vol. 47 (Summer):409-428). 
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As Kazemi rightly points out, the Islamic identity of the state (which has been bolstered by 
Khomeini) severely restricts the space allowed for women and leaves open the possibility 
that gains can easily be lost when the state reinvigorates its divine message (Kazemi 
1996:133). The precarious nature of women’s gains was underlined last June, when the 
recently elected parliament convened. As mentioned above, the parliament moved to reject 
proposals to expand Iranian women’s inheritance rights and to adopt the United nations 
convention banning discrimination against women. Instead, it introduced new restrictive 
measures (Fathi 2004:17). Nonetheless, as the parliament moved against reforms, an Iranian 
political analyst, Haleh Anvari, asserted that, 
The general trend in this country is moving towards reforms. These restrictions are 
like putting a little stone in front of a huge storm that is going for reform (Fathi 
2004:17).  
 
Previous developments, perhaps, will shore up women’s activism. For example, in the 
previous parliamentary elections of 1995 and 2000, speeches by women parliamentarians 
attested, argues Moghadam, “to changing and more assertive attitudes, with language that is 
less specifically Islamic and more compatible with what may be called ‘global feminism’ 
(Moghadam 2004:462). Perhaps more prescient is the fact that women’s affairs offices were 
established in each ministry and government agency and women’s activism led to the 
formation of numerous NGOs addressing women’s concerns. Additionally, a “lively” 
women’s press contributed to public discourse on women’s issues through books, 
magazines, and women’s studies journals. These, notes Moghadam, have been taking on 
important poltical, cultural, religious and social issues (Moghadam 2004:462). Moghadam’s 
comparative analysis of state, society and gender politics in Iran and Afghanistan also notes 
activism by Iranian legal analysts, academics, and ‘Islamic feminists’ in contesting 
institutional privileges of men over women (Moghadam 2004:449-67).  
 
The wider context of civil society will be a crucial element in how and whether women and 




Iran has long had a strong civil society, with a plethora of informal and formal groups, 
organizations, and associations characterized by patron-client relations. Notably, while the 
power of the state loomed large, both its autonomy from society and its arbitrary exercise of 
power have historically provided fertile ground for unequal reciprocity between civil society 
organizations and their ‘clients’ (Kazemi 1996:118).  
 
Kazemi situates the emergence of and relations between civil society and political and 
religious institutions within a historical framework. He also provides helpful sketch of semi-
autonomous organizations, comprising foundations, guilds, Islamic Committees, and 
professional associations, on which the following discussion draws heavily (Kazemi 
1996:141-150). Foundations in Iran are non-profit bonyads, or endowments established by 
nongovernment bodies for nonprofit activities. Islamic charitable endowments (waqf) also 
play a key role. Private foundations also function as a link between the state and society. 
Guilds also have a long history in Iranian civil society. The Tehran Council of the Chamber 
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of Guilds struggled to maintain its autonomy from the state after the revolution and 
managed “some degree of limited autonomy” (Kazemi 1996:149).  
 
‘Factory committees’ or shuras that emerged in the months after the revolution managed a 
good deal of autonomy though did not manage to organize across industries or survive the 
regime’s purging of their leftist members (Kazemi 1996:149-50). Tolerated by the 
government, these and other semi-autonomous organizations are currently able to put 
moderate pressure on the government, but do not function as an opposing voice (Kazemi 
1996:150).  
 
A ‘new generation’ of NGOs emerged recently that address women’s concerns, the 
environment, children, health, and training. Their work is variously informative, educational, 
service oriented, or in production and training. Reportedly, there are over 2,500 NGOs in 
Iran; Sayyah reports, though, that most of these have ceased to be active or affective soon 
after their initial formation due to a lack of expertise and absence of well defined goals 
(Sayyah 2003).  
 
In terms of its discursive weight, civil society has been the focus of numerous seminars, 
conferences, and publications since the beginning of Khatami presidency (Banuazizi 2001). 
Ali Banuazizi notes that the idea of civil society has also penetrated day-to-day politics in the 
slogans and promises of candidates for various offices. The following discussion draws on 
his online article.  
 
Three positions have emerged in debates on civil society in Iran. The first, promulgated by 
hard-line conservatives, is the notion that civil society is antithetical to the basic values and 
ideals of an Islamic society and state. These proponents are in the most powerful positions 
in Iran’s political establishment, controlling the means of violence as well as much of the 
economic power. 
  
The second group wants to Islamicize the idea of civil society, to make it compatible with 
the norms and values of the present order. An “Islamic civil society” would be clearly 
distinguishable from its secular, Western counterparts. Third are those who see the concept 
as ideologically neutral but a useful mean of structuring state-society relations and protecting 
the autonomy and freedom of citizens and associations. This group also wants to promote a 
more tolerant, pluralist, and democratic order. Banuazizi contends that this group was 
behind Khatami’s overwhelming election victory and is seen to be clearly in the majority 
among the electorate. They have “extolled the virtues of political toleration, the compatibility 
between Islam and democracy, the normalization of the country’s foreign policy, and above 
all, the vital importance of the rule of law” (Banuazizi 2001).   
 
The wider political context has a direct bearing on the fate of reform in Iran and, 
consequently, on the efficacy of civil society. Farhad Kazemi provides an excellent analysis 
of ideological and factional divides in Iran following the revolution and their institutional 
context. Kazemi notes that fissures in the Iranian political system are problematic, and that 
the battle between supporters and detractors of reform continues. He suggests that, 
In spite of all the regime attempts to control civil society and undermine institutions 
of reform, the final outcome is not necessarily determined. The harsh onslaught on 
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reformers has done significant damage to their progressive agenda and has led to 
widespread disenchantment with politics (Kazemi 2003:92). 
 
More ominously, Kazemi notes that “politics of despair” is emerging that reflects “a growing 
popular sentiment that normal political processes are not effective since they do not respond 
to legitimate demands for participation in the system” (Kazemi 2003:92). This is particularly 
marked among the youth which are seen as an, albeit unorganized, pro-democracy force that 
is openly questioning the “religious straightjacket” imposed on them (Kazemi 2003:93).  
 
A vibrant civil society in Iran faces a reform movement that is, since the last elections, 
institutionally weaker and a clerical regime that is unpopular but stronger. The large middle 
class and the fact that women are increasingly educated will, perhaps, continue to be salient 
factors in Iran’s civil society and reform movements (see Moghadam 2004:464). The 
following list of civil society organizations and donors draws on Sayyah’s brief note on 
NGOs in Iran (at http://www.payvand.com/news/03/jan/1114.html):  
 
Rayhanato Nabi Charity Institute 
 
Kahrizak Charity Foundation 
www.mahak-charity.org 
 
Green Front of Iran 
www.greenfront.org 
 
The Society for the Protection of Handicapped Children & Youth 
www.tavanyab.org 
 
Association for Protection of Women 
 
Women & Social Development Association 
 
Women Organization Against Environment Pollution 
 
Hamyaran NGO Resource Center 
www.Iranngos.org 
 
Noavaran Innovation Group 
 
Mother & Child’s House Group 
 
Institute for Women’s Studies & Research 
 




Civil Society’s Youth Association 
 
Center for Women Participation 
 
Qom’s Commission for Women’s Affairs 
 
Family Planning Association of Iran 
 
Roshdieh Charity Association 
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Payam Hajar Cooperative 
 
Hazrate Mehdi Association 
 
Association for Supporting the Socially Vulnerable 
 
Imam Sadegh’s Philanthropic Foundation 
 
Women’s Society against Environmental Pollution 
 
Convention on the Right of the Child 
 
 
International Agencies in Iran 
 
FAO (Food & Agriculture Organization) 
 
UNDP (UN Development Progamm) 
 
UNDCO (UN International Drug Control) 
 
UNFPA ( UN Population Fund) 
 
UNICEF (UN Children Fund) 
 
WHO (World Health Organization) 
 
IOM (The International Organization for Migration) 
 
UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) 
 
UNIC (UN Information Center) 
 













Parliamentary elections took place on January 30, 2005 (suffrage is universal in Iraq and the 
minimum voting age is 18). The legislative branch of government, the National Assembly, is 
to consist of 275 members. The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the 
Transitional Period states that the judiciary is independent, and “it shall in no way be 
administered by the executive authority, including the Ministry of Justice,” as it had been 
before the war. Instead, a Higher Juridical Council consisting of various judges is to 
supervise the federal judiciary and shall administer its budget. The Iraqi court system 
comprises Civil Courts, Courts of Personal Status, and Criminal Courts. Jurors of the Courts 




A provisional constitution went into effect in 1970. A new interim constitution was adopted 
in 1990. Following the war, the Iraqi 1990 Constitution is no longer in force. The Iraqi 
Governing Council (IGC) unanimously approved an interim constitution, or Transitional 
Administrative Law (TAL) on 8 March 2004, which is to be in effect until 2005 when a 
permanent constitution will be adopted. The Law is to be followed by an addendum which 
will include provisions for non-direct elections of an interim representative government for 
the transfer of administrative power in 2005 
(http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/iz__indx.html). The Law establishes a parliamentary 
system, with legislative powers in an elected National Assembly. The presidency will have 
more than symbolic powers. Nathan J. Brown, professor of political science and 
international affairs at George Washington University provides an analysis of various articles 
at: http://www.geocities.com/ nathanbrown1/interimiraqiconstitution.html.  
 
Islam as source of legislation –  
 
Brown notes that Article 7 had provoked international and domestic controversy in that it 
attempts to represent a compromise between those wanting Islam as the primary source of 
legislation and those wishing it to be “a source.” Brown notes that absent any provisions for 
establishing who would have authority to interpret sharia, it is unclear whether the article 
would have legal binding. He notes, 
Providing that Islam is “a source” of legislation is vague indeed.  Other Arab 
constitutions refer to “the principles of Islamic law,” but the Iraqi Law refers only to 
Islam.  More important, the clause would seem to be an injunction to legislators to 
consult Islamic law but not to bind them to it, much less to any particular 
interpretation (url as above). 
 
Shi’ite clerics are pushing for Islam to be recognized as the guiding principle of the new 
constitution, with marriage, divorce, and family inheritance falling under Sharia law (for 
example, daughters would receive half the inheritance of sons) (Wong 2005:1).  
 
 
Gender provisions – 
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As a goal (rather than a quota), 25% of the national assembly seats are to be reserved for 
women (Art. 30) (http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/iz__indx.html). Regarding Article 11, 
Brown notes that a provision in an earlier draft, that grants both fathers and mothers the 
right to pass on Iraqi citizenship, has been removed in this one (url as above). Juan Cole and 
Shahin Cole have written a general analysis on gender issues for the Los Angeles Times 
(available through access to their archives, pending; url or ref. pending). Brown notes that, in 
Article 12, the provisions for gender equality is “very generous.” He states,  
Indeed, it is far more generous than in the United States (where an equal rights 
amendment to the constitution was never ratified).   However, other Arab countries 
with similar provisions (such as Kuwait) have not always implemented them fully.  
Kuwait bars women from voting in a manner that almost certainly violates its 
constitution. Yet it took over three decades for a court case to be raised challenging 
the ban, and the Kuwaiti courts have thus far escaped from ruling on the manner 
because of technical deficiencies in the cases that have been raised 
(http://www.geocities.com/nathanbrown1/interimiraqiconstitution.html). 
 
Protection of rights –  
 
Wide claims that the interim constitution provides for a bill of rights that is unparalleled in 
the region are seen as an exaggeration by Brown. Rather, Brown notes:  
by the standards of the Arab world, the rights provisions are not particularly 
extensive.  What is innovative is the number of rights that are absolute, not 
depending on implementing legislation.  The language here is often quite carefully 
drafted to close loopholes…However, the reliance on implementing legislation in the 
Iraqi case may raise significant problems [as] no formula is included insisting that a 
right cannot be limited in the guise of defining it (url as above). 
 
Article 15 addresses provisions for searches, detentions, and trials. Brown notes that this 
article is “unusually detailed,” and “particularly air-tight” in comparison to other 
constitutions in the region. Interestingly, Brown notes that, 
 
The prohibition of trials of civilians in military courts and the ban on exceptional 
courts is also quite unusual for the region (though not wholly unprecedented). 
However, this wording is flatly contradicted by Article 48, which provides for an 





There is a law governing NGOs, and a provision within the interim constitution to protect 
those working with international NGOs (Article 21), deemed “innovative” by Brown. 
Article 21 states: 
Neither the Iraqi Transitional Government nor the governments and administrations 
of the regions, governorates, and municipalities, nor local administrations may 
interfere with the right of the Iraqi people to develop the institutions of civil society, 




Labour rights –  
 
The TAL confirms the right to join trade unions and the right to strike and demonstrate, 
along with more general rights to freedom of assembly, of expression and protection from 
discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion etc., according to a report of the  






The two Yemens united in May 1990, with the two parties of the Yemen Arab Republic 
(YAR) or North Yemen and the People’s Democratic Republic (PDRY) or South Yemen, 
agreeing to share power in the transition parliament. In 1991, a constitution was adopted in a 
popular referendum which affirmed freedom of association “inasmuch as it was not contrary 
to the constitution,” along with other rights and “equal treatment” regardless of sex, colour, 
racial origin, language, occupation, social status, or religious beliefs (Carapico 1995:243).  
 
Sheila Carapico’s piece in Korany, et al. notes that the Parties and Political Organizations 
Law guaranteed ballot secrecy and the right of all adults to run for political office or join 
political parties (Carapico 1998:243). A number of parties and candidates campaigned in the 
1993 and 1997 parliamentary elections, and fifty women ran for parliament in 1993 
(Carapico 1995:248). Nonetheless, as Carapico notes, a number of issues remained 
undefined by the constitution. These included, among others, the nature of executive 
authority and the relationship of legislated law to religious law (Carapico 1995:243).  
 
The unity agreements were disregarded by the leadership, who had “the least to gain and the 
most to lose from democratic governance” (Carapico 1995:243). In response, a National 
Dialogue Committee of Political Forces, “armed with resolutions from scores of local and 
scholarly conferences,” produced an Accord of Contract and Agreement that was signed by 
the president, vice president, and parliamentary speaker in 1994 (Carapico 1995:224). This 
accord set limitations on executive powers and greater independence of the judiciary, and 
reflected the emerging pro-democracy movement. Civil war in the summer of 1994 and 
political repression intervened though (Carapico 1995:244).  
  
There are three main political parties and an additional 40 that formed after unification. The 
main parties are:  
- Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) dominated the bureaucracy and armed services and 
gained a following among peasants and students in the1970s in favour of unification 
(Carapico 1995:245).  
- General People’s Congress (GPC), founded in the 1980s as an umbrella organization 
within the regime and formed as a party during unification (Carapico 1995:244).  
- Islah, Northern-based reform party, also formed as a party during unification and is 
described by Carapico as “stridently ‘fundamentalist,’” and a “thoroughly modern” party 
(Carapico 1995:246-47). It is anticommunist, supports private property, family values, capital 
punishment and gun ownership. It is also, interestingly, critical of many Yemeni religious 
traditions and thus does not represent the whole spectrum of Islamist movement in Yemen. 
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For the 1993 elections, Islah conducted the first nationwide voter-registration drive for 
women (Carapico 1995:247, 249). 
 
Yemeni Ba’th Socialist Party, and pan-Arabism, traditionalist Islamist groups are included 
among the 40 smaller parties. An opposition coalition formed in parliament that, together 
with independents, has held most seats of parliament. 
 
The two Yemens also provide interesting examples of different ways in which civil society 
and the state are intertwined. In south Yemen, the emerging socialist state was fostered from 
within civil society--unions, clubs, Islamic movements--which played a direct role in political 
mobilization against the British and Yemeni sultans. The new socialist state incorporated the 
associations through the accord mentioned above. This gave associations a voice and 
benefits and resulted in 'law and order' that was lacking in north Yemen (Raymond 
Hinnebusch 1999:n.p.). Another aspect of civil society discussed in the literature with regard 
to Yemen is the difficulty of merging civil societies in the secular, socialist North Yemen 
with those in the South after unification. LDAs (traditional local development associations 
called ta’awuns) played important roles in the development of Yemen but the process of 
unification brought their demise as local councils were created (Carapico 1999). 
 
As mentioned in the recommendations below, Yemen presents a case of a dialectical and 
complex interrelation between the state and civil society (Hinnebusch 1999:n.p.). The long 
and strong support in Yemen for socialist or social democratic programs, and for women’s 
rights, trade unionism, and cooperatives warrants further investigation into how these 
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the beliefs of the Prophet Mohammad; Use of Islamic teachings by Skalli to convince others 
that the religion espouses values that protect women.  
Leggett, K. (2004). Women win new rights in Morocco by invoking Islam. Wall Street Journal - Eastern 
Edition, 244(28) B1-B2.  
Discusses how Muslim women in Morocco can now divorce their husbands, collect alimony, 
and receive some types of inheritance due to legislation advanced under the umbrella of Islamic 
law. Abolishment of practices such as polygamy; Efforts of women's rights advocates such as 
Nouzha Skalli to transform society by working within the religious traditions; Opposition to the 
new laws from extremists who are dissatisfied with the law because of its lack of conformity to 
the beliefs of the Prophet Mohammad; Use of Islamic teachings by Skalli to convince others 
that the religion espouses values that protect women.  
MacMaster, N. (2004). Torture: From algiers to abu ghraib. Race & Class, 46(2) 1-21.  
Focuses on the practice of torture to the detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Publication of 
a massive body of evidence on the systematic use of torture by the army and police; Debates on 
the damage done by counter-insurgency to the victims and to the individuals and regimes 
deploying the troop; Impact of the planned invasion of U.S. President George W. Bush's 
administration on leading to a renewed interest in French theories of revolutionary warfare.  
Mahdavi, S. (2003). Women in Iran: Gender politics in the Islamic republic\ women in Iran: 
Emerging voices in the women's movement (book). Middle East Journal, 57(4) 695-698.  
Reviews the books "Women in Iran: Gender Politics in the Islamic Republic" and "Women in 
Iran: Emerging Voices in the Women's Movement" by Hammed Shahidian.  
Mahdavi, S. (2003). Women in Iran: Gender politics in the Islamic republic\ women in Iran: 
Emerging voices in the women's movement (book). Middle East Journal, 57(4) 695-698.  
Mednicoff, D. M. (2003). Think locally -- act globally? cultural framing and human rights movements 
in Tunisia and Morocco. International Journal of Human Rights, 7(3) 72-102.  
This article applies a concept from the political science and sociological theory of social 
movements to the comparative study of indigenous human rights activism in two North African 
countries in the 1980s and 1990s. Specifically, the idea of cultural framing is used to explicate 
why social mobilisation around the rhetoric of human rights was most successful in Tunisia and 
Morocco during a particular period. Drawing on interviews, documents and secondary material 
about a prominent human rights movement in each society, the study argues that transnational 
human rights norms were adapted for local use in these two Arab Islamic societies with fairly 
little difficulty. The article concludes with discussion of the connection of human rights 
activism in each country and the divergent path each has taken with respect to contemporary 
political liberalisation. 
Moghissi, H. (1999). Away from home: Iranian women, displacement cultural resistance and change. 
Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 30(2) 207-217.  
The article focuses on cultural resistance in Iranian women. Any community whose sense of 
identity is collectively denigrated by the structural racism of the larger society feel the need to 
mute dissenting voices which challenge its sense of homogeneity, common fate and common 
cause. This resistance to change is more profound in the area of women's rights and gender 
relations. Women's demands challenge men's prerogatives in the family which is often the only 
stronghold of men's power in exile-where men can still feel in control and enjoy the sense of 
 106
empowerment which gender power arrangements secure for them. In this way, racism further 
marginalizes women of color and their interests and needs. They are pressured to suppress their 
commitment to gender equity in favor of `racial' solidarity. The younger generation within the 
Iranian diaspora may yet get the community to face racism and, instead of taking refuge in its 
own culture, get it to join anti-racist battles and collective struggles in the host country for the 
elimination of racist and patriarchal structures and relations.  
Mojab, S. (2001). Theorizing the politics of 'Islamic feminism'. Feminist Review, (69) 124-146.  
This article examines developments in 'Islamic feminism', and offers a critique of feminist 
theories, which construct it as an authentic and indigenous emancipatory alternative to secular 
feminisms. Focusing on Iranian theocracy, I argue that the Islamization of gender relations has 
created an oppressive patriarchy that cannot be replaced through legal reforms. While many 
women in Iran resist this religious and patriarchal regime, and an increasing number of Iranian 
intellectuals and activists, including Islamists, call for the separation of state and religion, 
feminists of a cultural relativist and postmodernist persuasion do not acknowledge the failure of 
the Islamic project. I argue that western feminist theory, in spite of its advances, is in a state of 
crisis since (a) it is challenged by the continuation of patriarchal domination in the West in the 
wake of legal equality between genders, (b) suspicious of the universality of patriarchy, it 
overlooks oppressive gender relations in non-western societies and (c) rejecting Eurocentrism 
and racism, it endorses the fragmentation of women of the world into religious, national, ethnic, 
racial and cultural entities with particularist agendas.  
Mojab, S. (2000). The feminist project in cyberspace and civil society. Convergence, 33(1/2) 106.  
Focuses on the critique of the civil society concept in the context of the West and the Middle 
East from a feminist point of view. Concepts of the civil society; Description of cyberspace as a 
civil society; Discussion on the feminist mobilization effort; Connection between cyberspace 
and the real space.  
Molavi, A. (1997). Cracking a men-only culture. (cover story). Christian Science Monitor, 89(248) 1.  
Discusses the role that women are beginning to play in the politics of Oman in the late 1990s. 
Women like Shukoor al-Ghammary, president of the Omani Women's Association and a 
member of Majlis As-Shura; Comments from Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id; How Oman compares 
to other Arab countries; The power wielded by Fatima Kheroussi, the finance manager of 
Petroleum Development Oman.  
Moussa, Rathiba Hadj and Pierre Beaudet (1995). Démocratie et movement associatifs en Algérie. Montreal: 
CEAD. 
Norton, A. R., & Singerman, D. (1997). Gender, politics and the state: What do Middle Eastern 
women want? Middle East Policy, 5(3) 155.  
Focuses on the role of women in the political arena in the Middle East. Political constituents in 
Egyptian political life; Fight for women's liberation in the Middle Eastern society; Creation of a 
political space by women in an existing national authority.  
Ozdalga, Elisabeth and Sune Persson (eds) (1997). Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim World. 
Richmond: Curzon Press. – Have not obtained. 
Ozel, I. (2003). Beyond the orthodox paradox: The breakup of state-business coalitions in 1980s 
turkey. Journal of International Affairs, 57(1) 97-112.  
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